
Dual Use Policy in Bulgaria: Between Innovation Strategies and Export Control Issues

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Abstract

The central point of the current analysis is the problem of dual use goods and technologies (DUGT). In common parlance, these are any products, software, or technology that may be used for both civil and military purposes. The paper studies national legislation in the field of Bulgarian technology and innovation policies and publicly accessible data concerning the few practical cases of dual use products. The analysis shows that there is a well-developed export control policy in the country, as well as good international cooperation. Innovation and technology development policy with regard to DUGT, however is completely absent. Based on the above data, the conclusion can be drawn that potential exists for both development and production of DUGT in Bulgaria. One of the fundamental requirements for establishing such production is the harmonization of national legislation and the creation of a legal base for conducting a policy of encouragement of dual use technologies.

Introduction

The problem of dual use goods and technologies (DUGT) is relatively new in Bulgaria—this terminology has come into use in the political vocabulary after the officially declared end of the Cold War. In the sphere of national technology policy, however, western developed countries started to consider different aspects of this problem from the early 1950s. During the period of block political and economic confrontation, the issue was examined mainly from two viewpoints.: First was an export control policy of ‘critical’ technologies, closely connected with a strategic role of the national military industry with respect to state defense policy. Second were innovation strategies for developing advanced dual use products both by civilian and military branches with respect to reducing the economic prime cost of new technologies.

Nevertheless, the technology policies of both Western and Eastern countries between the late 1940s and 1990s were motivated more by national security concerns than by any comprehensive economic strategy. The end of the Cold War emphasized the importance of a new technology policy, concerning the restructuring of the former military industrial base on macro (international, national and regional) and micro (inside the units—firms, government laboratories, R&D centers, etc.) levels. The new realities not only sparked a reorientation of technology policy, but also created persistent dilemmas for the design and implementation of these policies. The first dilemma is the tension between trade and technology policies, because the liberalization of the global trading system has broadened the agenda of trade policy to include many items of technology policy (e.g. domestic R&D subsidies, intellectual property protection, and even domestic competition policy). The second dilemma concerns the relationship between defense-related R&D programs and civilian technology development. (Ham & Mowery 1995, 90) The developed western countries have committed themselves to redirecting national R&D spending toward non-defense activities with greater emphasis on the dual use concept while the former socialist countries such as Bulgaria paid more attention to conversion policies.¹

The 'dual use' problem has been considered to be 'dual' since the early 1990s: on the one hand, support and development of high-tech military industry in the face of decreasing defense budgets, and increasing economic competitiveness of the countries through more effective allocation of the R&D resources on the other. If in the COCOM² period, the dual use concept was interpreted as a *negative* characteristic of technological development that impedes and complicates export control for critical technologies, this concept was seen as a possibility for solving the above-mentioned 'dual' problem after the changes that took place in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

What does 'Dual Use Goods and Technologies' mean?

The most widespread formal definition is that of the US Congress: 'Dual Use, with respect to products, services, standards, processes, or acquisition practices, means products, services, standards, processes, or acquisition

practices, respectively, that are capable of meeting requirements for military and non-military application' (Document 10 U.S.C. 2491).

Stated plainly, these are any products, software, or technology that can be used for both civil and military purposes. In the context of the efforts for non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, the above-mentioned definition is supplemented by the addition of a new DUGT category: such products that are or may be intended, wholly or partially, for use in relation to the development, production, maintenance, storage, detection, or dissemination of mass destruction weapons—chemical, biological, or nuclear.

These definitions do not, however, reveal the essence of the phenomenon. The difference between the two DUGT categories is the following:

- DUGT, according to the U.S. Congress definition, are goods and technologies that possess distinctive technological characteristics, which determine where they belong: to the military or to the civil sphere;³
- the second definition concerns products for which such distinctive technological characteristics are not obligatory. The control lists of products that are subject to embargo with regard to the non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons (MDW) contain civilian technologies, which due to their own characteristics are of key value for the development and maintenance of MDW and can meet military requirements without further modifications.

Bulgarian 'background'

Bulgaria is a small country in European terms. Before 1989, during the totalitarian regime, the country was subject to accelerated modernization. From the early 1960s until the late 1980s, significant electronic and military industries were developed in the country, the system of higher education and vocational training was modernized and expanded, there was a strong impetus for the development of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and for R&D work. The long-term purposeful investment in science and industry often exceeded the real resources of the country. The strategic goal was accelerated industrialization and development of science and technologies to the level of development in the western countries.

In spite of the huge investments in the middle of the 1960s, a continuous declining tendency started in the economy, which in fact led to a zero growth situation at the beginning of the 1980s, while there was negative growth in agriculture (Tchalakov 1998).

This was the beginning of the economic crisis in Bulgaria that is continuing to the present day.

During the socialist period, one of the most unfavorable effects of the military industry upon the scientific and technological development of eastern European economies was 'an almost total lack of reverse diffusion of the scientific and technical achievements made in military industry towards the rest of the industrial branches' (Tchalakov 2000). This characteristic feature of the Bulgarian military industry has been preserved even after the changes in the country.

Nevertheless, within the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact⁴ and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,⁵ Bulgaria was the country with the most developed military industrial base after the USSR. As the Cold War came to an end, the Bulgarian defense industry was entirely owned by the state and it enjoyed a high priority in all spheres—at regional, national and international (within the framework of the Warsaw Pact) levels. By the 1980s, it held approximately 10% of the country's industrial assets and employed 150 000 industrial workers (Dimitrov 2002). In 1985, Bulgaria ranked 12th in exports among the 39 arms exporting countries on a global level (Brauer & van Tuyil 1996, 129).

During the transition period, technology policy concerning the Bulgarian defense industry concentrated on the conversion issues dealing with the restructuring of the military enterprises as a whole. The possibilities for implementing the dual use concept and at least partly restoring innovation and R&D programs in the field were put aside. One of the main consequences was that *academic, industrial and political communities ignored the dual use concept, as well as all technology policies issues related to it.*

At the end of 2002, the capacity of the Bulgarian defense industry is downsizing by ten times or more and most of the conversion and privatization strategies and processes are unsuccessful (Dimitrov 2002). The failure of the conversion strategies is due mainly to the general economic crisis and political instability. As Dimitryr Dimitrov says:

[...] the main difference in the conversion processes that have taken place in the West and in CEE countries is that in the latter countries, arms producers had to restructure (and partly privatise) in a catastrophic economic situation characterized by high inflation, negative growth rates, insecure legal provisions, and a period of market orientation adjustments. Top managers, who represented the real assets of the old system, did not perceive themselves as potential pupils or recipients of advice [...] they failed to develop a realistic approach to international cooperation and to take the required step of restructuring in order to enter new high-tech markets (Dimitrov 2002, 66–67).

At the same time, the analyses of technology policy show that *the creation of a new legal basis for economic growth and technical change remain mainly in the declarative domain*, without any practical application and often dependent on private economic interests.

The Bulgarian defense industry, however, possesses major development potential: know-how, highly educated and trained people, licenses and last but not least, a material base for the production of armaments and specialized equipment for use in war. During the past twelve years the share of the defense expenses in the state budget has been comparable to that in the NATO countries, but the stable tendency to spend the largest part of the budget on current expenses in defense is the reason for the low level of investment spending (Annual Report on the State of Defense and Armed Forces 1999, 2000) (see Appendix, Figure 1 and Figure 2).

Nevertheless, together with the former military industrial base, at least two other spheres possess real potential for innovation: the fundamental and applied sciences as represented by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) and the newly founded high-tech firms, predominantly in the field of information technologies. At the same time, the new challenges of globalization—EU and NATO enlargement processes—, on the one hand, and the world-spread of terrorism on the other, have influenced industrial and technological change in terms of economic development and the indispensability of weapons capabilities.

The general framework for technology diffusion and links between universities and enterprises in Bulgaria is actually limited to the allocation of budget funds for the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and financing small research projects through the Applied Research Directorate at the Ministry of Education and Science. The encouragement of technology dissemination and linkages between

universities and industries still remain beyond the list of top priorities in the legal framework for the development of science in Bulgaria (Gueorgiev 2001, 26).

By the end of 2001, a large number of Bulgaria's leading institutes (most of them within the framework of BAS) failed to adapt to the market environment, and their activities as R&D centers gradually disappeared. In the same period, however, there were two positive changes in the market of R&D services.

- A new generation of small companies and research organizations is emerging, established by leading specialists in the respective sectors. The founders are for the most part highly skilled experts of vast experience in the respective area, who have separated from the huge research and design institutes. Most of these new units are characterized by flexible management, innovative thinking, and entrepreneurial spirit but are still in their initial phase of growth.
- The market of R&D products and services is increasingly oriented towards applied research, which is targeted and sponsored by external firms and organizations, contrary to the state-funded fundamental research in the past (Analysis of the Bulgarian Technology Development 2001, 13).

The three main areas of development of the Bulgarian technology and innovation policies over the last decade are: information society, high-tech branches, and science and research. These policies are very well provided with corresponding legal documentation on national/governmental level but they still remain more or less declarative on the everyday practical level.⁶ Bulgaria's participation in the Global Competitiveness Reports of the 'World Economic Forum 2000' allows for a comparative analysis of the country's position. As a whole, the rank of Bulgarian competitiveness in the field of innovative potential and technological development is still low. The country ranks 49th at best and is lagging considerably behind other SEE countries (see Appendix, Figure 3).

Bulgarian policy in the fields of DUGT and export control regimes

As already emphasized, the dual use concept did not exist among the official economic and political issues Bulgaria was facing before 1989. The inclusion of Bulgaria in the list of the so-called 'embargo countries',

the strict division of military and civilian industries in all socialist countries, and the extraordinarily high level of secrecy in the military sphere made the emerging and development of such a concept impossible. As Kornai points out, a large portion of the innovations during socialism were due to 'reverse-engineering' of advanced technologies produced in the Western countries. This fact significantly increases the role of the scientific and technical intelligence service for the success of innovation processes.⁷ From this viewpoint, there are no DUGT—the only issue that matters is whether a particular technology is advanced and whether it may be copied or bought by circumvention of the embargo, independently of its status: military, civilian or with potential dual use.

Until 1994, Bulgaria was included in the list of countries that were subject to the export control regime, known as COCOM. That meant that the official technological transfer of critical technologies from developed Western countries was impossible. After the termination of this regime and its reorganization into the so-called Wassenaar Arrangement (WA),⁸ Bulgaria found itself in a strange situation for a period of two years. Officially, it was still an 'embargo' country, since it was not a member of the new arrangement. At the same time, a great number of these prohibitions fell because of the fact that the country began negotiations for membership in WA. Two years later, Bulgaria was accepted as a regular member of WA. The first official document that deals with DUGT is the 'Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and in Dual Use Goods and Technologies' that came into force as of 21 January 1996 (State Gazette, Issue 102/21.11.1995). Its main 'work tool' is the 'Control List of Military and Special Products, Technical Assistance and Services', which is an integral part of the law and is based on former COCOM Munitions List. In 1998, this Munitions List was replaced by the 'Control List of Conventional Weapons and Dual Use Goods and Technologies', which is identical to the Control List of WA. The law on DUGT and the Control List, as well as the 'Decree for Adoption of Regulation on Implementation of the Law on Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies' (State Gazette issue 115/10.12.2002) mark the beginning of Bulgarian dual use policy. In the years that followed, the

dual use concept was considered occasionally in many legal documents—most of them in connection with the development of three main directions: information society, high-tech branches, and science and research.

The main legal documents and state authorities related to DUGT are listed in Table 1 (see Appendix, Table 1).

The analysis of official documents with regard to DUGT shows a very high level of compliance between national policy and international regulations. At the same time, the analysis of the legal base in the field of Bulgarian innovation and technology development policies⁹ shows a complete lack of programs and initiatives concerning the development of the dual use concept. DUGT are treated only from the viewpoint of export control but never from the viewpoint of their innovation potential. This situation ‘returns’ the country to the situation before 1989, when DUGT were treated only as subject to export control because of their significance to the national security. The only difference is that Bulgaria now is ‘on the other side of the barricade’—before 1989 it was in the list of ‘embargo countries’, now it belongs to the countries that enforce these regimes. One of the main factors preventing the establishment of R&D programs in the area studied, is the extraordinarily high level of secrecy that covers the military sphere. This situation is due in part to ‘force of habit’ in the development of the military industry before 1989. Many of the laws and regulations for working with specific technologies still remain unchanged. We are thus confronted with the paradox situation of R&D technologies produced in BAS over thirty years ago are still treated as secret. Moreover, there is no elaborated mechanism for technology transfer from the military to the civilian sphere. The secrecy and the lack of a legislative framework in this field make such a transfer impossible. In a study on the effect of Bulgaria’s admission to the Wassenaar Arrangement, these problems constitute the main body of discussion among representatives of the academy, the national patent office, and state institutions (Tchalakov 1999). One of the main conclusions was that in spite of the admission of the country to the WA, the real R&D process relating to dual use technologies is still practically impossible due to a complete lack of conformity between different laws and regulations in national legislation.

But is there potential for dual use technologies development in Bulgaria?

This question cannot be answered directly due to the lack of studies in this field. Despite this, I will try to defend the thesis that there is such a potential and moreover, I will show some cases where it has been realized. According to the dual use concept, the development of these technologies may be initiated by both civilian and military institutions. In the second case, these are usually special programs or organizations sponsored by the military budget aiming at innovations in the field of dual use technologies. A classic example of such a program/organization is the creation of DARPA¹⁰ in the U.S.A. The experience of the developed countries, however, especially of the U.S., shows that one of the most successful means for the development of DUGT is the elaboration of innovation programs in state funded R&D laboratories. In Bulgaria, all three groups potentially exist: newly founded private high-tech firms, R&D institutions at BAS and Bulgarian Defense Industry (BDI) enterprises. For the present, I would deliberately 'skip' the private firms from my analysis in view of the fact that the information about them is largely inaccessible. A future study of Bulgarian high-tech branches will show us if they really have potential for 'dual use'.

There is a well-established practice for working on projects ordered and sponsored by the Ministry of Defense within the framework of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Officially, there were special funds, which were intended only for military research in the common budget of BAS until 1991. Because of the general economic crisis and as a result of the restructuring and long-term plan for modernization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, these funds were terminated during the past ten years. In December 1999, however, BAS and the Ministry of Defense signed a Framework Agreement, which proved to be an important driver for activating and intensifying interdepartmental collaboration in the field of research and technology applicable to Bulgarian national security and defense. 'As a result of this agreement in the year 2000—for the first time in ten years—scientists and experts from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences joined various projects and scientific events (workshops, symposia) in the field of defense and dual-use research and technology' (Center for

National Security and Defense Research 2003). Taking into account the successful cooperation, the Minister of Defense and the President of the BAS renewed the Framework Agreement for another five years on 28 December 2001. As a national research institution that concentrates the basic research potential of Bulgaria (BAS incorporates 67 research institutes and laboratories), the Academy took up the task of providing scientific support for determination and implementation of national security and defense policy and planning. For this purpose, a Center for National Security and Defense Research was established at the Executive Board of BAS in 2003.

In fact, besides the departmental institutes and R&D centers at the BDI enterprises, the research institutes at BAS were the biggest units for fundamental and applied research in the military field throughout the socialist period. In some institutes there were, and still are, special teams or departments that deal only with military applied research. One of these is the Institute of Metal Sciences, which still continues to produce military technology—not only for the needs of the Bulgarian Armed Forces but also for foreign markets (BAS web site 2003). An example of its successful work in defense-related materials and technologies is the award given to it at the International Military Fair in Hanover 2000. Another example is the Institute of Physics, which in 1996 developed an R&D project for the production of mobile refrigerating containers with low-volt power source, designed for the army's health services. After the funding suspension due to the general economic crisis in the country and the decreased budget of the Academy, the institute started producing mobile refrigerators on the basis of an existing prototype. Because of their specific technical characteristics, the mobile cooling systems were successfully sold on foreign tourist hunting markets.¹¹ In this case, though technology was not designed as 'dual' at first, it is a classical example of a so-called 'spill-over' process from the military to the civil sphere. Some authors (Cowan & Foray 1995, 852) do not accept spill-over processes as a sign of the 'duality of technology', while other authors (Alic et al. 1992; Molas-Gallart 1997; Molas-Gallart & Sinclair 1999) analyze spill-over in the framework of the dual use concept.¹²

The defense industry enterprises and their R&D centers are the second group of organizations that have potential for development of dual use products. As mentioned above, the former Military Industrial Complex was decreased more than tenfold during the transition period—in terms of production quantity, number of employees, R&D budget, and annual turnover. The restructuring of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, according to the plan for joining NATO, and the general privatization process in the country had a powerful influence on the defense industry. As a result of the conversion programs, and most of all due to the market pressure in the new competitive environment, defense-related enterprises began to develop civilian products too. Within five years, the share of civilian products of the biggest military repair factory TEREM reached more than one third of the total production volume (see Appendix, Figure 4).

Another munitions factory—SAMEL SAMOKOV—started its product modernization and conversion process in 1997. Over the past few years, however, orders for military production were drastically reduced, and at the beginning of 2002, the proportion of civilian production was about 90% (Dimitrov 2002, 91). The biggest defense producer—VMZ SOPOT—specialized in artillery cartridge cases, is still undergoing privatization procedures and its civilian production was about 15% at the end of 2001 (Dimitrov 2002, 92). Still, there are no publicly accessible data on whether part of the production of these enterprises meets the requirements for DUGT. We can, however, find indirect evidence. It may be traced in the several public scandals that burst during the past five years due to the violation of the ‘Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and in Dual Use Goods and Technologies’ by private and state-owned defense-related firms. Most indicative is the example of the company BETA–CHERVEN BRYAG, which under the cover of export of civilian products managed to sell arms to an embargo country (Bulgaria Exports Arms to the Annual Amount of 240–250 Million Dollars, 2003). A similar case is that of the TEREM branch in the city of Targovishte (Nikolov 2002).

Conclusion

The analysis of the current legislation in the field of dual use policy and the few practical cases studied, shows that there is a well-developed export control policy in the country, as well as good international cooperation. Innovation and technology development policy with regard to DUGT, however, is completely absent. I thus conclude that the dilemma between trade and technology policies does not exist in Bulgaria. The second dilemma, regarding the relationship between defense-related R&D programs and civilian technology development is still outstanding. The restoration of the partnership between BAS and the Ministry of Defense is a good starting point to finding a solution. Whether it will lead to development of the dual use concept or whether the separation between the military and the civil branches will remain unchanged, is a question for future studies.

Based on the data presented above, I conclude that potential exists for both development and production of DUGT in Bulgaria. One of the fundamental requirements for establishing such production is the harmonization of national legislation and the creation of a legal base for conducting a policy of encouragement of dual use technologies.

Notes

- ¹ In some cases Russia is an exception to the rule, but this is not the central point of the present analysis.
- ² The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (also known as COCOM) was established in 1949 to facilitate multilateral cooperation to control strategic goods and technology. Its 17 foundation members were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. The embargo regime was terminated in March 1994 (*COCOM: An End and a Beginning*, 1994).
- ³ Such distinctive technological characteristics may be futures, such as: vibration steadiness, protection against penetrating radiation, thermal steadiness, power capacity, efficiency, etc. For specific examples, please see Kulwe & Smit (2002) and MacKenzie (1993).

- 4 The political and military alliance of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries, known as the Warsaw Pact, was formed in May 1955 as a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949. The foundation members of the Pact are Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR.
- 5 Also known as Comecon or CEMA, it was founded in January 1949 by representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union 'to organize a more broadly-based economic cooperation among the countries of the people's democracy and the USSR'. Later other countries joined it: Albania, the Democratic Republic of Germany, Cuba, the People's Republic of Mongolia, and Vietnam.
- 6 For detailed analysis of Bulgaria's technology development policy in these three directions, please see Gueorgiev (2001, 8–23).
- 7 For more information about this problem, please see Tchalakov (2000).
- 8 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies was established on 29–30 March 1994 in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, by 17 former COCOM members. Bulgaria joined the WA at the Plenary Meeting on 12 July 1996 in Vienna.
- 9 Strategy and National Program for Information Society Development in the Republic of Bulgaria, October 1999; National Strategy for High-technology Development in the Republic of Bulgaria, December 1999; National E-commerce Strategy, June 2000; National Strategy for the Encouragement of Small and Medium Enterprises; High-tech Activities and High-tech Parks Act, 2002; Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defense 1999, 2000; Plan for Modernization of the Army in the Republic of Bulgaria 2002–2015; Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, April 1999; Military Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2002.
- 10 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was established in 1958 as the first U.S. response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik. Since that time, DARPA's mission has been to assure that the U.S. maintains a lead in applying state-of-the-art technology for military capabilities and to prevent technological surprise by her adversaries. The DARPA organization was as unique as its role, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense and operating in coordination with, but completely independent of, the military research and development (R&D) establishment. Strong support from the senior DoD management has always been essential since DARPA was designed to be an anathema to the conventional military and R&D structure and, in fact, to be a deliberate counterpoint to traditional thinking and approaches (DARPA web site 2003).

- ¹¹ The information on this project was collected by students in Sociology (second year) at Plovdiv University 'Paisii Hilendarski' and by the author during the Students Summer Practice 2002—'Study of Laboratory Life', headed by associate professor Ivan Tchalakov.
- ¹² More details about the difference between both viewpoints see Galev (2003, draft version, not published).


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
Appendix

Figure 1. Shares of defense budget




Source: *Annual Report on the State of Defense and Armed Forces 1999*, Ministry of Defense, Sofia, October 2000.

Figure 2. Shares of investment and current expenditures




Source: Annual Report on the State of Defense and Armed Forces 1999, Ministry of Defense, Sofia, October 2000.

Figure 3. Competitiveness ranking



Source: *The Global Competitiveness Report 2000, World Economic Forum (cited in: Analyses of the Bulgarian Technology Development 2001).*

Figure 4. Shares of military and civil production of the TEREM enterprise (1992-1996)



Source: TEREM web site, May 2003.

Table 1. Bulgarian Dual Use Policy (January 2003)

National Legislation	Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and in Dual Use Goods and Technologies (State Gazette issue 102 / 21.11.1995, effective as from 21.01.1996)
	Decree for Adoption of Regulation on Implementation of the Law on Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies and for Amendment of Legal Acts of the Council of Ministers, Council of Ministers, Decree No. 38 of March 6, 1996
	Decree No. 233 of 8.11.2000 on the Foreign Trade Regime of the Republic of Bulgaria of the Council of Ministers (State Gazette issue 93 / 14.11.2000, effective as from 1.01.2001)
	Interdepartmental Commission on Export Control and Non-proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons by the Minister of Economy
	Law on Control of Explosives, Arms and Munitions
	Decree for Implementation of the Law on Control of Explosives, Arms and Munitions
International organizations and agreements	DECISION No. 704 of 1 November 2002 on the adoption of the Guidelines for Transfer of Sensitive Chemical and Biological Items of the Australia Group—International Export Control Regime
	The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies
	OSCE Criteria on Conventional Arms Exports

Control lists and 'sanctions' countries' lists	Decree No. 205 of 1998 on Control List of Arms and Dual Use Goods and Technologies, Council of Ministers (State Gazette issue 108 / 1998)
	Bulgaria enforces UN Security Council sanctions
	Bulgaria enforces EU Council Regulation No. 1334/2000/*
Licensing authority	The Interdepartmental Council at the Council of Ministers is responsible for developing Bulgaria's national policy on foreign activity in conventional weapons and on dual use goods and technologies
	The Council of Ministers accepts the List of Arms and Dual Use Goods
	The Interdepartmental Commission on Export Control and on Non-proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons at the Ministry of Economy issues a permit for every individual business transaction and controls the implementation of the Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and in Dual Use Goods and Technologies
	The Interdepartmental Council on Military Industrial Complex and on Mobilization Preparedness of the Country at the Council of Ministers issues a license granted for the execution of the respective activity
* Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 of 20 June 2000, setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual use items and technology (as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 2432/2001 of 20 November 2001).	