

The Role of Transnational Environmental Organisations in Transferring Forest Stewardship Council Technology to Russia

Maria Tysiachniouk & Jonathan Reisman

Abstract

Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is seen in this paper as the main technology in the arsenals of international environmental organisations to protect forests worldwide. Management practices developed in the West must be adapted to Russia's unique post-Soviet context in order to import FSC to Russia. For instance, many of the social aspects of FSC certification, mainly community participation in forestry decision making, find little existing infrastructure within Russia's rural localities where most logging takes place. This paper will show how international NGOs use the forces of the market to jump-start such institutions and create a basis for social, environmental, and economic modernisation within Russia's forestry sector.

Introduction

Much of the global environmental discourse in the past few decades has focused on preserving the world's dwindling reserve of forests (Bostrom 2003a; 2003b; Cashore et al. 2004; Lehtinen et al. 2004; Meidinger 2003; Meidinger et al. 2003; Tysiachniouk & Reisman 2004). Russia stands as a keystone in this preservation effort, with 21% of the world's forests and 25% of its virgin stands. Based on this supply of raw materials, Russia has become an invaluable timber supplier for the entire world. After Perestroika and the politico-economic collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia opened its borders to the West, and opened its forests to the preservation efforts of the West's environmental movement. In conjunction with a burgeoning civil society on local and regional levels throughout the country, international environmental organisations came to Moscow and thus entered the milieu of the Russian forestry sector. Greenpeace came in 1992, followed by the World Conservation Union

(IUCN) in 1993, and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 1994. These organisations began to develop agendas for the preservation of Russia's forests, by adopting Western preservation technologies in Russia and by linking with all forestry actors, including federal and regional governments, Russian and multinational logging companies, the public, smaller environmental organisations on the local level, forestry scientists, and the media.

Each of these international organisations, and their corresponding branches in Russia, employ specific techniques and strategies for promoting environmental preservation. Yet they all, in pursuit of nature preservation, try to link Russia's natural resource production to environmentally sound markets in the West. One of the main technologies in their arsenals is forest certification under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).

Forest certification is a technology that can help save the world's forests and their people by institutionalising sustainable forest management in vulnerable environments. Transnational civil society organisations have mounted a major effort over the past decade to transfer it to societies in transition (Meidinger 2003; Tysiachniouk & Reisman 2002; 2004). Like many modern technologies, forest certification is a package of physical techniques and organisational arrangements that includes all the elements necessary to achieve a specific purpose—in this case sustainable forest management. It is a vital technology because global market forces and rapid population movements are combining to gravely endanger forests and forest communities in transitional societies, by which we mean both the traditional 'developing' and the 'transitioning' post-communist countries which are currently trying to adapt to the global market system. Forest certification is not easy to transfer to those societies, however, because it seeks not only to re-channel global market forces, but also to restructure many local practices and institutions. It thus confronts numerous obstacles, which must be understood and addressed if sustainable forestry is to be implemented in transitional societies. This paper will determine the primary factors that inhibit or promote the transfer of forest certification to societies in transition.

Forest certification as a technology

Forest certification was developed in the early and mid-1990s as an institutional technology to promote sustainable forest management in tropical countries. It was developed by a broad civil society coalition of environmental NGOs, professional foresters, progressive wood buyers, and community forestry advocates as a way of allowing consumers in wealthy countries to ensure that their purchases of tropical wood products would not contribute to tropical forest destruction. The developers drew on long experience not only in forestry, but also in development policy and institution building generally. Among the key lessons of those experiences were that technologies cannot be successfully transferred without being located in a structure of social relationships (Marton 1986) and that they must be adaptable to local conditions (Lall 1987; 2000). Thus, the developers of forest certification sought to create a technology that included not only conceptual information on forest management (that was the easy part), but also organisational structures for implementing that knowledge and participatory techniques for fitting it to local conditions. They did this by developing a full-blown forest certification system under the auspices of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), a free standing, not-for-profit organisation responsible for the development and implementation of the system. Although the FSC quickly spawned a number of imitators and competitors, it remains the leader in the field. The FSC continues to set the standard for other certification systems and has developed by far the greatest presence in transitioning societies. Therefore the research proposed here will concentrate on the transfer of the FSC system. The system has several key elements (Meidinger et al. 2003).

- (1) *Global principles and criteria for proper forest management.* These cover a broad array of objectives, including the protection not only of ecological functions and biodiversity, but also of indigenous, community, and labour as well as economic interests. Forest certification is thus built on the tripartite environmental, economic, and social understanding of sustainable practices, which was powerfully articulated at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.

- (2) *Organisational structures for implementation.* These include both internalisation of management practices in the forest management organisation and adoption of an external accountability system based on independent accredited certifiers. Much of this structure is built on the model developed by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), although some of the developments in the two systems were parallel, rather than sequential.
- (3) *Participatory decision making mechanisms* for defining and amending appropriate forest management policies. These operate at the level of the individual forest, the regional or national level, and the global level. They include ongoing business-government-NGO partnerships and general processes for public participation. The necessity of participatory processes to developing appropriate and legitimate policies was a lesson learned in virtually every sector of economic and political endeavour in the 1970s and 1980s.
- (4) *Mechanisms to boost demand* for certified forest products. These are necessary to spur the adoption of certification in the world's forests. For a variety of reasons, the organisations pursuing this task mostly operate at a distance from certification programs. They rely on diverse strategies including traditional advertising, creating 'buyer groups' of retailers and wholesalers, and also direct action, such as demonstrations threatening major market actors with loss of revenue if they do not support certified products ('market campaigns'). The idea of using the power of the market to promote desirable social ends has a long history among academics, but flowered among environmental practitioners during the 1980s.

In order to import FSC and other sustainable technologies to Russia, management practices developed in the West must be adapted to Russia's unique post-Soviet context. This paper will look at the detailed processes through which FSC is imported to Russia, and through which chains of timber supply are linked to chains of timber demand. Through a series of regional case studies, this paper will illustrate circumstances that facilitate adaptation and importation of FSC, as well as those that hinder it. Our analyses will track and evaluate the role of three specific contributing factors to FSC success: a region's proximity to the border with

Europe, NGO intervention and guidance on the local level, and finally, the importance of NGO-business and NGO-government partnerships.

Methodology

Field research was conducted from January 2002 to June 2004 and consisted of interviews in Moscow with representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources, State Duma, NGO headquarters, and representatives of industry. This data basis was supplemented with four case studies (Yin 1994), each in a different region of Russia. In all, 107 interviews were conducted.

In choosing localities, we isolated cases that illustrate various combinations of the factors mentioned above. We selected FSC certified forest cases in the Archangelsk region, in the Pskov region, and in the Komi Republic. Our case studies differ in closeness to the European border—Pskov is close, Komi is far, and Archangelsk is close but without adequate transportation infrastructure. Our case studies also differ with regard to NGO involvement in the certification process. In the Pskov and Preluzye model forests, WWF created a showcase of successful sustainable forestry. In Dvinskoy, the initiative to certify came from the company's German owner and NGOs were not involved. While in Malashuika, the FSC Certification Centre helped the company to certify, despite the lack of direct guidance from an NGO.

The third factor, government and business involvement in the effort to achieve sustainable forestry, also differentiates these cases. Governmental involvement reached a peak in the Preluzye Model Forest, while in other cases it was much less involved. In Malashuika, Dvinskoy, and Pskov, industry played an important role in seeking certification. In the Preluzye Model Forest, small companies renting the territory were much less involved.

Context for importing and adopting FSC

Russia's forest sector represents a unique context for importing FSC certification. Ever-present barriers to forestry innovation include the lack of effective state forest policy¹ and the permanent restructuring of forest

management systems on federal and regional levels.² During Soviet times, forestry was widely practised throughout Russia, and logging operations moved quickly from plot to plot. Extensive forestry continues today, however, it is much more concentrated along access roads and in places where transportation infrastructure already exists. Timber production substantially decreased after the fall of the Soviet Union, and financial difficulties continue to limit new development. Logging is especially concentrated near Russia's border due to the export opportunities offered by these regions. For this reason, stands of High Conservation Value Forests (HCVF) in these areas are currently in danger.

The Russian government's stance on these issues is overshadowed by its promotion of free trade. The possibility of state intervention seems non-existent. In 2000, President Putin closed the Federal Forest Service, a regulating agency, and transferred its responsibility to the Ministry of Natural Resources. The Ministry of Natural Resources thus became responsible for both protecting and harvesting forests. Needless to say, this bureaucratic transfer greatly diminished the level of forest protection throughout the country. Interaction and coordination among different government divisions are strained by such shifts in jurisdiction, yet this type of restructuring continued after Putin's re-election in 2004.

Today forest management is directed by the largely outdated Forest Code of 1997. Russia's transition period features a constant restructuring of its executive branch, which requires consistent updates of its legislation. According to a government source, a new, and radically changed, Forest Code will be issued by the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005.³ In the new code, the government hopes to create mechanisms to facilitate foreign investment in the Russian forest sector. Toward this end, the code will make concessions easier (Petrov 2003) and will probably further shuffle agency responsibilities. Concessions will give more responsibility to companies that use forests and make them responsible for forest revitalisation and thinning. Change is also predicted for *leskbozes*, state structures that oversee individual forestry operations on the local level. Many expect the privatisation of these individual units will probably lead to privatisation of *leskbozes*.⁴ Earlier editions of the code proposed the introduction of private forest ownership by 2010. However, this proposal was opposed by thousands

of different stakeholders.⁵ In all probability, the land will remain public property for many years to come,⁶ but mechanisms for forest privatisation will be developed in the long run.

Over the past decade, the Russian government has displayed an incrementalist approach to forestry legislation that has failed to keep pace with rapid changes occurring in localities throughout the country. During this period, non-state mechanisms of governance, including environmental NGOs, have shown that they are an essential part in this on-going intersectoral dialogue. The old system of national governance proved ineffective in protecting Russia's forests, and many doubts have arisen as to the future efficacy of the current one. Throughout Russia, the state is often seen as unreliable and unstable.

Role of transboundary NGO networks in promoting forest certification

In the 1990s, Greenpeace International organised several direct actions against companies which were harvesting HCVF in the Karelia and Archangelsk regions. In partnership with other NGOs, they embarked on a mission to create maps of all old-growth forest stands in Russia, and distributed these maps to both Russian timber producers and their Western consumers. These maps, it was hoped, would be used to monitor the chain of forest production, and thus prevent the sale of old-growth timber. Simultaneously, the Taiga Rescue Network⁷ organised consumer boycotts in Europe against timber from these valuable forest stands. This campaign managed to convince the huge Scandinavian logging company StoraEnso, and led it to develop an environmental policy in its Russian operations.⁸ This instance represents one of the greatest successes of environmental protection in post-Soviet Russia. StoraEnso's subsidiary company STF Strugy, which operates in the Pskov region near Russia's border with Estonia, thereafter sought FSC certification. Many other multi-national and domestic companies logging in Russia were forced to rethink their production in order to avoid coming under fire from environmental organisations on behalf of European consumers. This action also helped to give the NGOs credence among timber producers.⁹ Such NGO transboundary

campaigns helped create an environment for the introduction of FSC into Russian forestry. WWF partnerships with other large companies working in Russia, including IKEA, also helped put FSC on the forestry scene.

In recent years, WWF has become the primary promoter of FSC forest certification in Russia. In 1998, WWF began disseminating information about FSC to representatives of government and business through a series of conferences held in regions with substantial forestry production. These initiatives attempted to facilitate an intersectoral dialogue among government, forest users, and environmental NGOs. It also created working groups on national and regional levels that worked to formulate standards of development and to create model-demonstration projects. For example, in 2000, WWF founded a forest producer interest group called the Association of Ecologically Responsible Forest Companies. In 2002, WWF, together with Greenpeace and several Russian NGOs, developed regionally specific criteria for ecologically responsible forest businesses. These criteria were used by WWF for the development of step-wise ecological policies for forest companies. They were approved and adopted by the Global Forest Trade Network (GFTN) as principles of wood procurement and membership. Through the Association of Responsible Forest Companies, WWF connects forest producers with 'green' timber buyer groups in the west.¹⁰

WWF developed a step-wise approach to certification for companies, and guides producers through this process. The first step involves adoption of an environmental policy and preparation of an eco-action plan. In the second step, the company conducts an internal audit in order to survey wood legality and its chain of custody system. In the third step, the company experiments with landscape planning and HCVF protection. Ultimately, WWF attempts to align company operations with criteria of environmental sound timber production (WWF 2003, report and power point presentation).

Non-state actors and introduction of FSC

Forest certification is the most significant effort in recent attempts to address Russian forestry issues. Current barriers to sustainability include an irresponsible, unorganised, and highly opaque system of forestry, which

leads to large amounts of illegal timber entering circulation. FSC certification and the international demand for sustainable timber are economic means of controlling forestry. Theoretically, it can help to strengthen forest governance structures by balancing the interests of producers, consumers, nature protection, and civil society (Ministry of Natural Resources 2003).

FSC promotes an internationalisation of Russian forestry by facilitating multinational corporations that cater to European market interests. By securing much needed foreign investments, FSC can ultimately help to expand Russia's timber-processing industry. Furthermore, corporate appreciation for sustainable forestry can help address the issues of extensive and concentrated border-based forestry (Shvarts 2003).

The most significant issue now facing nature protection efforts in Russia is the preservation of virgin forests and HCVEs wherever they continue to exist. Under FSC certification guidelines, companies are required to identify and make efforts to protect HCVEs, with an eye towards biodiversity conservation (Ptichnikov, Voropaev, WWF Report 2002). Also significant is the role local communities can come to play in making decisions related to forest use. FSC criteria demand the participation of civil society in the forest governance structure, thus pushing logging companies to become responsible employers as well as neighbours. Our case studies will illustrate past achievements and future possibilities towards these ends.

Case studies description

Case study #1: Dvinskoy settlement (Dammers case)

Local context. The settlement of Dvinskoy and its forestry enterprise are located in the Archangelsk region on the bank of Northern Dvina River, 300 km from the city of Archangelsk. Today, Dvinskoy has a population of 500, and the Dvinskoy Forest Enterprise remains a key employer, however, it has a diminished role in the upkeep of settlement infrastructure.

Industry characteristics. The company Holz Dammers Moers (HDM) GmbH was established in Germany in 1959 in North Rhine Westphalia. Its wood processing operations have since expanded to include representation

throughout Europe, as well as in the US, Australia, China, Turkey and Kazakhstan. HDM entered Russia in 1992 and set up a saw mill and wood panel production facility near Archangelsk. The company now operates in two settlements, Dvinskoy and Bobrovsky Reid.

During Perestroika's muddled privatisation binge, Dammers managed to acquire a controlling share in Dvinskoy's forest enterprise. Today, Dammers effectively runs logging operations in Dvinskoy and makes all important decisions, including appointing the director and management staff and determining salaries. Dvinskoy also rents timber production equipment from Dammers and is in permanent debt to the foreign company.

Certification. In 1999, Holz Dammers Moers GmbH decided to undergo the FSC certification process for its Dvinskoy Forest Enterprise. This move was driven mainly by economic concerns, due to the fact that Dvinskoy products go predominantly to German markets. The initiative to certify came from the owner of Dammers' German headquarters, which had come under fire from the domestic environmental movement. At the same time, Greenpeace Russia had been pestering Holz Dammers Moers GmbH because of HCVEs situated on the firm's leased territory. As the decision to certify entered its implementation phase, the company signed a moratorium agreement with Greenpeace on the felling of old-growth forest.

The German owner of Dammers chose the Swiss auditing firm IMO, due partly to conveniences of language, and the Archangelsk branch received FSC certification in 2000. Since then, Dammers has failed to consistently maintain FSC standards. In 2002, two years after receiving official FSC approval, Dammers' certification was suspended because of multiple violations of Russian logging legislation and delays in delivering workers' salaries. In 2003, the FSC certification was reinstated due to improvements in these areas.

Impacts on the community. In 2000, when operations in Dvinskoy forests received FSC certification, local villagers and even workers in the enterprise knew virtually nothing about the relevance and consequences of the achievement. While the company posted certification information on its web site and hung posters in its offices both in Archangelsk and in Dvinskoy, ordinary

citizens learned little about the proceedings. Workers do not have Internet access and gleaned little information from the posters. All in all, only participants in Dammers' governing bodies knew anything about their certification initiative. Only in 2002–2003, while FSC certification was temporarily suspended, did the head of Dvinskoy's forest enterprise write an article in the local newspaper about certification and FSC requirements for sustainable logging. Thus, when losing certification became a possibility, the enterprise began demanding that workers follow the new rules and regulations. Workers learned about biodiversity conservation in sporadic and informal sessions, and were subsequently penalised for acts such as discharging gasoline into the forest or littering.

Enterprise workers and villagers alike remain uninformed about FSC social standards and the public right to participate that comes with FSC certification. Locals perceive Dammers as an outsider and as a German exploiter driven only by the desire for maximum profit at the expense of workers and villagers. Such perceptions, and the lack of information, seriously hamper a full realisation of the potential of certification. A labour union of forest workers recently began fighting for workers' rights and reduction of salary payment delays, however, union leaders are not yet competent in using FSC certification as a bargaining tool with Dammers' corporate governance.

Notes. In this Dvinskoy case, the FSC certificate has had minimal impact on the community, while environmental improvements are haphazard and slow in coming. There has been improvement in logging practices and timely salary payment discipline. The only significant change on the ground has been Dammers' moratorium on logging the HCVPs in the vicinity of Dvinskoy.

Case study #2: MalashuikaLes

Local context. Malashuika is situated in the Archangelsk region's Onega district, five kilometres from the White Sea. The settlement was founded in 1943 when the railway from Archangelsk to Murmansk was built, mainly by inmates of prison camps situated near the site of present day Malashuika.

Industry characteristics. MalashuikaLes leases 336,000 hectares (830,256 acres) of forest and logs around 1000 hectares (2471 acres) annually. It employs 336 workers, the majority of whom are residents of Malashuika. Officially, MalashuikaLes is an independent business, however, in all practicality, it belongs to the Onega Forest Harvesting Enterprise, which in turn belongs to the ORIMI holding group. Onega has a controlling package of shares in MalashuikaLes and buys all of its wood for processing. Furthermore, Onega makes all financial, social, and environmental decisions pertaining to MalashuikaLes' operations.

Certification. A representative of the ORIMI holding group, also Onega's former executive director, initiated the effort to certify Malashuika's forests. Onega implemented the plan and made all decisions relating to the process of certification. It chose the German auditing company GFA Terra Systems GmbH, and also received assistance from the Archangelsk Certification Centre, which is partly supported by WWF. The Certification Centre served as a hands-on guide in certification.

Onega's primary motivation in seeking FSC approval was the desire to increase exports, and consequently, to boast an 'ecological' image for the company among foreign consumers. According to the director of ecology at Onega, a neighbouring enterprise called Solombala on two occasions received a notice from its European buyers that, beginning in 2005, they would only accept certified wood. Onega decided to take preventative action and certify its operations. They chose MalashuikaLes for their first trial because its director had expressed interest in certification. In addition, the lands leased by MalashuikaLes see virtually no illegal logging due to the lack of roads. This gives the territory a head start in meeting FSC demands. In 1999, Onega began modernising MalashuikaLes' operations by investing in new harvesting technologies and equipment and training its workers in their use.

After receiving certification, Onega's concerns over its image were abated. The ultimate goal of raising prices has not yet been achieved, however, because the percentage of wood coming from MalashuikaLes is too low to receive the FSC label. While this may disappoint the company, it provides an incentive to certify other territories. In the framework of certification requirements,

MalashuikaLes developed a long term strategic development plan that will operate until 2052. In addition, the company established a moratorium on logging HCVPs, which accounts for approximately 10% of its leased territory.

Impacts on the community. In the village of Malashuika, MalashuikaLes is perceived as a continuation of the settlement's former Soviet forestry enterprise, which was responsible for maintaining social infrastructure and physical infrastructure. The citizens thus expect the company to maintain these standards of the past. The governing bodies of MalashuikaLes also seem to harbour Soviet-type views on the social responsibilities of a forest enterprise. Thus, fortunately, FSC requirements for social standards do not contradict the perceived corporate accountabilities toward the local community. MalashuikaLes supplies firewood for workers and elderly citizens, maintains a heating system in the settlement, and provides electricity for the village. In addition, MalashuikaLes funded new power lines to forest settlements and is planning to build a new water supply system. Despite these benefits, villagers view this upkeep in comparison to the luxuries provided during socialism, to which they pall in comparison. Villagers do not proactively demand anything from the enterprise, however, they complain and grumble during conversations and interviews.

The most significant improvement brought about by certification is salaries consistently being paid precisely on time. Furthermore, the director of MalashuikaLes believes that certification can be more effective in regulating forestry practices than legislation from either Russia or the European Union. He argues that while non-compliance with Russian legislation is a permanent feature of logging throughout the country, non-compliance with certification requirements can lead to the loss of one's certificate, a damaged image abroad, and thus a loss of income.

Certification has done nothing to improve public involvement in decision making processes in Malashuika. Local self-governance systems do not exist, with the third sector represented locally only by Malashuika's Veterans Council. Such fundamentals of civil society as libraries, schools, and public clubs, which in other Russian settlements unite people, are inactive in Malashuika. Even the workers' union was initiated by governing bodies of the MalashuikaLes enterprise, and only because certification requires

the existence of a union. Both MalashuikaLes and Onega have made efforts to promote environmental and social activism. They developed a procedure for public participation in decision making, however, the initiative failed when the public expressed no interest in participating. They also revitalised a Soviet-type forestry school in which high school students study forestry and help professional foresters plant trees and clean forested territories. Furthermore, the company initiated an ecological study circle in the local school and holds ecological education sessions for its workers.

Notes. In this locality, we see a paradoxical situation. FSC requires that businesses answer to pressure from civil society, however, there is no civil society operating in this respect. MalashuikaLes actually has to create units of civil society and guide their activities itself in order to comply with certification requirements. Here, the local business maintains standards and upholds workers' rights, and yet the workers themselves make no demands whatsoever.

Case study #3: Pskov Model Forest

Local Context. The Strugy-Krasnie region has a population of 18,500 people, about half of whom live in the regional centre, Strugy-Krasnie. This settlement is in the Pskov oblast and lies 68 km from the city of Pskov. Before Perestroika, much of the economic activity in the region consisted of branches of St. Petersburg, Moscow, or Riga enterprises that were specialised for the Soviet military-industrial complex. Since the late 1980s, however, many of these operations have disbanded or lost their stability. The economy has declined and there is currently much unemployment. Logging companies in the region are export-oriented, and make use of the good railway links to Latvia and Estonia. Accordingly, the Strugy-Krasnie district is an important raw material provider for the international timber industry of Europe.

Project description. The Pskov Model Forest is a WWF demonstration project in cooperation with the company STF-Strugy, a subsidiary of the Scandinavian logging conglomerate StoraEnso. The project operates on 46,000

hectares (113,666 acres) of the Strugy-Krasnie Leskhoz, which STF-Strugy has leased. STF-Strugy employs very few people from this region, and so the Strugy-Krasnie community does not heavily rely on it.

Industry Characteristics. StoraEnso is a multinational Swedish-Finnish firm that has been conducting export-oriented logging enterprises in Russia for several years. In 1996, while its subsidiary LotEnso was operating in the Karelia Republic of Russia, several environmental organisations, including Greenpeace, the Socio-Ecological Union (SEU), and the Centre for Biodiversity Conservation, protested LotEnso's un-ecological practices of logging old-growth forests through international media. The company's Western European market was significantly affected by this action. According to one informant, 'the consequences for LotEnso were terrible'.¹¹ Because of this incident, StoraEnso became interested in FSC certification to protect its markets. In 1995 it established a new enterprise, STF-Strugy, in the Strugy-Krasnie region and leased land from the local *leskhoz* for 49 years with the goal of meeting international criteria for sustainable wood production.

Certification. Top-level representatives of StoraEnso pushed STF-Strugy to modernise its operations and receive FSC certification. These standards and techniques, however, developed abroad as they are, frequently conflict with the Russian forest code and accepted industry norms. The company was repeatedly fined by the *leskhoz* for violations while trying to align its practices with FSC. Furthermore, the firm experienced many conflicts with the community. The local public was suspicious of a foreign company which they felt was coming to cut and send their forests abroad. Some citizens went so far as to interfere in their operations. The sight of a truck carrying logs was interpreted by the locals to mean, 'things in the forest are going badly'. Much of this concern and hostility was directed at STF-Strugy and its workers. Not being the PR powerhouse that WWF is, STF-Strugy failed to resolve these conflicts. In 2000, WWF came to the region and partnered with the company. In essence, WWF and StoraEnso, two monumental institutions of the West, descended on a small, ordinary Russian locality and modified the commercial environment

to fully comply with FSC. WWF, serving as something of a sustainable forestry guru, guided the company by creating a plan of action based on scientific research. WWF also served as the project's PR directors by coordinating each move with government officials and civil society institutions. STF-Strugy then carried out the logging as the action plan specified.

The budget for the Pskov Model Forest during the period 2000–2003 was one million US dollars. The logging firm StoraEnso contributed 20% of this, WWF Germany contributed another 20%, and the remaining 60% came from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). In the summer of 2003, the Pskov Model Forest was audited by the company Smart Wood and received an FSC certificate. Since then, the Pskov Model Forest has become an educational playground of sustainable forestry, as well as a tool for proliferating the FSC ideology to other regions of Russia.

Impact on the community. In theory, the Strugy-Krasnie region has been self-governing since 1994, but in practice, this is not true. The structures for self-government have been set up, but they are working poorly and have little effect on the lives of people in the settlement. Russia has no history of stakeholder involvement in decision making. There are no mechanisms for such involvement, and the people have no past experience in this field. WWF attempted to succeed where STF-Strugy had failed, i.e. with respect to involving the public in forestry.

WWF took a multifaceted approach to this task, arguing through an extensive media campaign that by switching to the new, imported way of doing things in the forest, Russia's economy, environment, and society would benefit. WWF used television programs and newspaper publications, and organised seminars and workshops. Raising public interest in the Model Forest in this way laid the groundwork for official public participation. The Model Forest created a Forest Club that theoretically brings all forest stakeholders together into a productive dialogue. The Forest Club meets once every three months, and attendees include representatives of the company STF-Strugy, *leskhoz* workers, administration, forest scientists, WWF staff, and all interested local citizens. WWF bills the Forest Club as a model of democracy and citizen involvement in forestry as it ideally, although not always practically, occurs in the West.

One of WWF's most brilliant strategies for involving the public was establishing a small grant program that would pay for any research or creative project that pertained to the Pskov Model Forest. WWF's strategy was to take activities that already exist and enhance their quality while steering them towards environmental awareness and support of the Model Forest. Grants funded ecological summer camps and environmental clubs, and even turned a traditional community holiday involving saying 'goodbye' to winter into an 'environmental goodbye'. One interesting advertising strategy saw WWF sponsor a local school's soccer team. The team is called Panda, and the kit features the WWF panda logo as well as the label of the Pskov Model Forest. Each game they play promotes nature, and everywhere the team goes they bring information about the Pskov Model Forest. WWF further impressed the local population by bringing the famous soccer team Zenit from St. Petersburg to play the Panda team. Many people expressed excitement about this game, which also had a theme and symbol for nature. In short, WWF used the project's extensive funds to establish the Panda logo as a lasting visual fixture and the phrase 'sustainable forestry' as a lasting linguistic fixture in the Strugy-Krasnie community.

The small grant program also drew scientists and members of government agencies into the fold of this project. Forestry research is very advanced and ecological in Russia, however, there is often little funding put towards implementation. Thus, WWF's small grant program became a unique opportunity for researchers from the Russian Forest Academy and for government officials in the Ministry of Natural Resources, several of whom carried out forestry research funded by WWF. The WWF also worked with the government to hold seminars and workshops, distribute information about FSC, and organise a number of trips to Sweden so that government officials could study logging techniques similar to those that WWF and STF-Strugy wish to import. The Model Forest's demonstration plots became a key instrument with which to educate forest stakeholders. By logging different forest plots with different technologies and techniques, the Model Forest showed different volumes of wood production with different repercussions for the secondary forest.

In Strugy-Krasnie, as in all projects that require the involvement of the Russian public, WWF uses the local intelligentsia (the educated class) as a tool for linking with the rest of the population. This Model Forest's small grant program, for instance, focuses on scientists, teachers, educators, a museum curator, and librarians. These people are often community leaders and help shape the rest of the community. For this reason, a social expert working with WWF called such citizens a 'golden fund' that 'helps to form public opinion' (Interview, 2002). Teachers and educators especially help to spread knowledge and ideas, and shape the mindset of succeeding generations. WWF brought its Model Forest, its money and its Panda emblem into the classroom by funding teachers' environmental education initiatives through the project's small grant program. This includes such programs as recycling, nature calendars, computer education, and a Children's Club of Friends of WWF. With the benefits of FSC forestry and Western logging technology in school curricula, they will in time become part of the local culture.

Notes. The Pskov Model Forest presents a strong case for business and NGO cooperation in environmental protection. Both the company StoraEnso and the NGO WWF were necessary for the success of the project. Clearly, FSC certification requires much more than simply a desire to run ecologically friendly logging operations. Due to Russia's unique social and economic contexts, it also requires extensive networking, convincing, and a deluge of information dissemination. STF-Strugy, and perhaps most other logging companies, are incapable of providing the latter. So, WWF brought an invaluable capacity to its partnership with STF-Strugy. This case demonstrates the necessity of NGO legwork for Western commercial interests in Russia's natural resources.

Case study #4: Preluzye Model Forest

Local context. The Komi Republic consists of 416,800 square kilometres just west of the northern Ural Mountains. In villages throughout Komi, economies are slow and many forest producers are close to bankruptcy. The forests are a vital aspect of the republic's economy. The forest sector

has provided the primary source of income since 1917, employing one-third of the republic's working population (Karakchiev 2000).

Throughout the 20th century, during both Soviet and post-Soviet times, inadequate revitalisation practices have had consequences on both local villages and the profitability of industrial harvesting. For instance, in the 1990s, 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres) of Komi's forests were clear-cut, while *leskbozes* and forest producers planted trees on only 20,000–23,000 hectares (49,420–56,833 acres), i.e. roughly 10% of the deforested area. Furthermore, the forests of Komi are often the centrepiece in an ongoing conflict between natives of the region who traditionally rely on them and non-natives who are interested in industrial exploitation. When the Soviet state collapsed resulting in regional separatism, the forest sector of Komi suffered further. Between 1990 and 1994, Komi forest producers lost many of their traditional forest markets in southern Russia, Moldova, Kamir, and the Ukraine. Production and forest revitalisation plummeted (Karakchiev 2000).

According to WWF, the Republic of Komi was one of the first regions in Russia to give credence to HCVMs in regional policy¹² ('Virgin Forests' in WWF Bulletin, No. 1, March 2001, p. 2). This represents a good governmental environment for implementing a sustainable forestry initiative. Nevertheless, specially protected areas in the republic do periodically face danger depending on who is working in the power structures at the time. In 2001, Komi's governor signed an order for revitalisation that included inventory of virgin forests on five *leskbozes*.

Project description. The Preluzye Model Forest covers 800,000 hectares (1,976,800 acres) on the territory of the Preluzye *leskboz*. As opposed to WWF's project in Pskov, this territory features permanent settlements, various industries, and the operations of many different logging companies. 27,000 people live on the territory of the Preluzye Model Forest, representing ten different nationalities—native Komi people comprise 62% of the population and Russians 32%.

The project began in 1999, and procured financial support until 2005. For the first three years, the budget was 1.5 million dollars, all of which came from a single source, the Swiss Agency for Development and

Collaboration. WWF oversaw the project for the first three years, however, it then left all responsibility to the NGO Silver Taiga.¹³

WWF (Silver Taiga) created the Preluzye Model Forest in a region built on forestry, however, not on exporting. The Komi Republic is much further to the east than Pskov oblast, and this one factor results in a disparity between the two different model forests. Pskov is close to Russia's European border and so it attracts the export-oriented subsidiaries of multinational European logging firms. With little infrastructure, this region is not nearly as attractive, and so the business environment is very different to that in Pskov. As we will see, this difference greatly influences the potentialities of a model forest project.

While the Model Forest project works on the territory of the Preluzye *leskboz*, it is not actually a part of it. It assists the *leskboz* in monitoring the forests and enforcing the forest code. In return, the *leskboz* helps the Model Forest implement strategies on the local level and prepare the *leskboz* for certification. The project communicates with logging enterprises leasing territory on the *leskboz* and tries to promote an interest in voluntary forest certification under FSC. WWF links with the local public through the use of educational institutions, media, and discussion groups. It tries to involve the local public by promoting environmental education, self-governance structures, and involvement in the Model Forest project and decision making. It also works with representatives of the regional government, including the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Forest Committee, in a decision-making council. This council consists of ten members and is regularly consulted for implementation, consultations, and political support.

Coordination of the Preluzye Model Forest is accomplished by a working group of 13 people who elaborate concepts and plan strategies for development of the project. This group includes two members of WWF Komi working with scientists from Komi and Archangelsk, a member of Komi's Ministry of Natural Resources, the head of the Preluzye *leskboz*, a representative of the Northern State Lesoustroistva based in Vologda oblast, and a member of the NGO Committee for Saving the River Pechora.

The strategies and orientation determined by this working group are then implemented on the regional level by the coordinating council

of the Preluzye Model Forest. This council consists of WWF and, since 2002, Silver Taiga employees that coordinate the activities of the Model Forest on the regional level in Preluzye. It is broken down into 8 thematic groups, each with a specific focus. The innovation group works closely with the *leskboz*, hosts and organises the work of all experts on the project, and implements demonstrational forest plots and all Model Forest innovations. The ecology group deals with virgin forests and biodiversity. The economy group deals with economic questions and improving the effectiveness of forest use. The education group organises courses and trainings on different levels in the regions. The forestry group includes researchers from scientific institutions working on improving forest management. The public outreach group organises discussions and tries to interest the local population in the project. The geographical information systems (GIS) group is generating a database and maps of the *leskboz* territory. The information group publishes bulletins and works with journalists and media. All of these actors make recommendations and are coordinated through the coordinating council.

The Preluzye Model Forest is also attempting to set the stage for future certifications in Komi. A regional working group, headed by representatives of the Preluzye Model Forest, is developing FSC standards that specifically apply to the logging environment of Komi. Taking into account the unique social, economic, and ecological contexts of this region, the working group will basically redefine sustainable forestry in order to correspond to the situation on the ground. This has been done in regions throughout the world to facilitate FSC certification. This group also works closely with the national working group based in Moscow, which is developing a set of standards for all of Russia. A company could eventually comply with either set in order to certify.

Industry characteristics. More than ten independent forest producers are currently working on the territory of the Preluzye *leskboz*. Research done by the Model Forest's economy group in 2002 indicated that many of them are close to bankruptcy.¹⁴ Due to the lack of stability, the *leskboz* rarely agrees to lease agreements with a contract period of more than five years. Many see the development of wood processing capabilities as a key to

improving the forest sector's situation. Because domestic Russian markets lack the environmental sensitivity and higher prices of European markets, these companies see little need to invest money in the creation of a green image. These companies do not feel the influence of European economics as strongly as export-oriented companies working closer to the border. For this reason, an NGO partnership with industry remains largely undeveloped. Nevertheless, the Preluzye Model Forest received FSC certification in March of 2003.

Certification. The Preluzye Model Forest most significantly differs from its Pskov counterpart in that WWF's main partner is the Preluzye *leskboz*, a government structure. The aim of this project was to certify not the leased land of one company, as in Pskov, but rather to certify the forest management of the entire *leskboz*. In a sense, the *leskboz* acts as a local representative of the forest landowner—the federal government—, however, this situation demanded an entirely different strategy. WWF never worked with those actually cutting the trees in Preluzye. Due to lack of cooperation among businesses, it was forced to take a more roundabout way to sustainable forestry, with few on-the-ground, operational improvements. The Preluzye *leskboz* received an FSC certificate in March 2003, but wood produced by forest leaseholders do not automatically receive the FSC stamp. In order to produce 'sustainable' timber, a company working within the Preluzye *leskboz* must go further and receive a chain of custody certification. Thus, the accomplishments of the Preluzye Model Forest are only a boost or head-start to local companies in that they can now more easily obtain the ultimate FSC stamp. Only one company, LuzaLes, has managed to do this.

Impacts on community. The Model Forest has helped the local community with new technology and support for schools and libraries. In the regional centre Obyachevo, WWF Komi bought computers and fax machines for the libraries and new furniture, buses and equipment for the school (Interview with budget coordinator, Preluzye Model Forest, 2002). Also, by encouraging companies to meet the preconditions of FSC certification, the Model Forest has helped to improve working conditions for some of the

local population employed in the forest sector. For instance, the company Noshulsky LZK built two new dining rooms for serving hot food and a shelter for forest workers (participant observation, meeting at Preluzye *leskboz*, 2002). These expenditures were linked to certification, however, the company's 2001 budget would not permit any further changes.

In regard to the social aspects of FSC certification, WWF (and after 2002 Silver Taiga) acted much the same as in Pskov. This project encountered similar barriers from the public, including a widespread suspicion of forestry in general. The head of the Preluzye Model Forest's public outreach program explained that people assume all logs carried by trucks come from the same plot leaving nothing (Interview, 2002). WWF overcame this perception by preaching the Western gospel of sustainable forestry, especially its promotion of social sustainability, which would better the public's lot. They circulated information through libraries and schools, created discussion clubs, and used media to create television shows, newspaper articles, and art shows dedicated to loving and preserving nature. Through a small grant program, WWF funded Ph.D. research into forest economics for local students and helped revitalise old Soviet structures for producing non-wood forest resources. Community relations represented a very extensive aspect of the Preluzye Model Forest.

As with Pskov, WWF sees environmental education as a foundation upon which future sustainability can be built. So, logically, WWF focuses its support on educational institutions, primarily libraries and schools. WWF helped create an environmental information centre in the library of the settlement of Obyachevo, the centre of the Preluzye region. This centre serves as a distribution centre that disseminates information to libraries throughout the region. Furthermore, regular educational seminars related to the Model Forest take place, including seminars for teachers, youth leaders, librarians, small businesses, and heads of village administrations.

In order to directly involve the public in forestry, WWF created a club similar to Pskov's Forest Club. It is called 'Shuvge Parma' (translated to 'the sound of wind through the taiga forest' in the Komi language). The meetings of this club gather various members of the local public, *leskboz* workers, scientists, and policy makers in discussions about forests and

their uses. One difference between this and Pskov's Forest Club is the size of the Preluzye *leskboz* and the fact that it contains dispersed villages, all of which are involved in the Shuvge Parma club. For this reason, Shuvge Parma is mobile and travels to different villages throughout the region, holding meetings and promoting public participation.

A successful example of public participation and activism started by this club is the case of virgin forests on the territory of the Model Forest. Here, WWF was able to mobilise members of the population to protect a virgin area that had already been leased by the large company LuzaLes. While WWF had to first explain the concept of old-growth forest, it was easily accepted by much of Komi's native rural population, which is generally against industrial harvesting of any kind. LuzaLes had already begun building an access road to log this plot of old-growth forest, but WWF successfully educated and linked up with influential members of the local population (i.e. intelligentsia) to oppose the company. In the end, LuzaLes gave up most of the plot, while a compromise allowed them to log four small sections.¹⁵

One aspect of how WWF tried to align the Preluzye *leskboz* with FSC social standards shows the constraints of certifying a *leskboz*, rather than a company's leased land. WWF held public meetings in which citizens could highlight areas of the *leskboz* in which they gather berries and mushrooms. The Model Forest chose areas marked by many people and ultimately created a map of important gathering spots. In theory, this map would be used by socially conscious companies to choose their logging plots. In reality, the map has become only a tool of the *leskboz* to advise companies on which plots they may encounter resistance from the local population. Like the FSC certificate received by the *leskboz*, these maps serve only as possible stepping stones in future attempts at sustainable forestry. These successes of the Model Forest do not directly translate into improvements within the forest because the logging companies are not sufficiently involved in the project. This shows an important difference between Pskov and Preluzye. The NGO-business partnership is the foundation for sustainable forestry success.

Analysis

The importance of NGO cross-border networks for FSC introduction and dissemination

Greenpeace and WWF assign a planetary value to HCVF forests, and so they have raised large sums of money and invested enormous effort for their protection. In this process, they have come to play an important role in Russian forestry politics. As we saw in our cases, Greenpeace's international network has used its muscle to influence all certification scenarios (see Table 1). Greenpeace was not directly involved in building the Pskov Model Forest, however, its direct actions in Karelia and European markets forced StoraEnso towards certification. As a direct result of Greenpeace's market muscle, this huge company partnered with WWF to create the Pskov Model Forest as a demonstration project.

Table 1. Certification scenarios and certification impacts

	MalashuikaLes	Dvinskoy	Pskov Model Forest	Preluzye Model Forest
WWF involvement	low	low	high	high
Certification centre involvement	high	low	no	no
Greenpeace interest	high	high	no interest in the area, but influenced StoraEnso's desire for FSC	low
Government involvement	low	low	moderate	high
Business involvement	high	high	high	low
Public participation	no	no	high	high
Impacts	high	low	high	high

The global Greenpeace network, which used direct action as one of its primary weapons of environmental change, together with the Scandinavia-based Taiga Rescue Network, convinced buyers in Europe of the need for 'green' timber. This market demand filtered quickly through the usual routes of monetary exchange, ultimately to the companies in Northwestern Russia, who saw the need to certify their operations. Domestic pressure from Greenpeace Russia, in conjunction with Russian national NGOs, increased Russian timber producer interest in certification. These trans-boundary NGO efforts were mainly directed to protect Russian old-growth forests in Northwestern Russia. As a result, moratoria on old-growth forest plots were established in Dvinskoy, Malashuika and Preluzye. Even after the moratorium is agreed upon and the certificate achieved, Greenpeace and other Russian NGOs constantly monitor logging practices on these certified territories. Non-compliance can result in suspension of the FSC certificate, as we saw in Dvinskoy.

Yet, while environmental concerns are voiced with such vigour, social concerns often seem to slip through Russia's burgeoning civil society. Greenpeace and most other Russian NGOs do not monitor a company's compliance with social standards. Because of the lack of interest from environmental NGOs, as well as the lack of social NGOs in the area, Dammers' FSC certificate has brought minimal social impact. The Dvinskoy case showed a persistent shortcoming in Russian civil society, which did not exist before the fall of the Soviet Union. International environmental organisations were quick to infiltrate Russia's social milieu. Offices were quickly established, projects created, and concerns voiced before the smoke of Perestroika had cleared. However, social organisations are not as forthcoming or abundant. WWF does have consistent social concerns, however, there is nothing currently in Russian society that compares to the multi-billion dollar duo of WWF and Greenpeace. This is a major imbalance in Russia's civil society, and in Dvinskoy it has appeared as an unbalanced implementation of sustainable forestry. In order to balance social needs with environmental needs, there must be a growth in socially-minded Russian civil society.

Case studies also show that WWF's networks are essential for promoting forest certification in Russia. WWF is the most capable organisation in Russia in promoting intersectoral dialogue and public participation

in decision making. By looking at the Pskov Model Forest, one saw an abrupt improvement in communication when WWF joined STF-Strugy to create the project. In the case of Dammers, WWF was not involved, and so the FSC certificate did not bring about substantial changes in forest practices. Furthermore, it hardly improved the quality of life and employment in the community. In Malashuika, the FSC Certification Center, while it represents only minimal and indirect WWF involvement, was essential for helping MalashuikaLes prepare for certification. Still, the public is poorly informed and does not sufficiently participate in decision-making processes. The case of MalashuikaLes differs from both model forests in that the absence of a healthy intersectoral dialogue severely limits what can be agreed upon, and therefore, what can be achieved. WWF-built networks that include an array of stakeholders in forest management is an essential step in building democratic institutions in Russia.

As mentioned under the Pskov Model Forest, the Russian intelligentsia serve as an important link between an NGO and the public. During Soviet times, state educational services attempted to create a class of educated community leaders throughout the country. Top universities drew students from communities of all sizes—from large Siberian cities to small northern villages—in order to disseminate the message of the new socialist empire. In post-Soviet times, the intelligentsia continues to shape local communities, and this is the use to which WWF has put them. The epistemic community is essential for linking with the greater community at large. Using the small grant program, for instance, WWF involved teachers, librarians, and local scientists in the model forest project. This strategy is an efficient and necessary way of conducting forest preservation projects in post-Soviet space.

While the intelligentsia stand between the NGO and the public, the NGO must stand between the logging company and the public. This is a necessary niche for an environmental organisation to play in Russian communities. As mentioned in several of our cases, the public is generally suspicious of logging companies. Villagers throughout Russia continue to depend on forest products such as mushrooms and berries, and so they see logging companies as competitors for resources. With a foreign logging company, such as STF-Strugy representing

StoraEnso, the situation is further strained, and the intermediary role of the NGO becomes even more important for any kind of dialogue. In the Pskov Model Forest, we saw an abrupt change in business-public relations when WWF entered the scene. This linkage is a necessary component of FSC sustainable forestry, and the NGO must make the connection through media and information dissemination.

Such linkages between stakeholders are the foundation of a democratic institution. Thus, by facilitating intersectoral dialogue, NGOs such as WWF are building new types of governance and democracy. Non-state actors are necessary in this process. WWF brings financial support and know-how, both of which are severely lacking within Russian communities. In turn, the success of FSC certification is based on this democratic foundation.

The importance of national governmental involvement in FSC introduction and dissemination

In Russia, non-governmental actors cannot operate apart from the government because all land, including forests, is federal property. Government agencies manage forests from the Ministry of Natural Resources on the federal level to the *leskhoz* on the local level. Furthermore, the *lesoustroistvo*, an agency of regional government, creates plans and limits for harvesting by region. Thus, forest certification and all third sector nature protection initiatives must include the Russian government as a landowner. In our cases, the level of involvement of governmental agencies varied.

In the Preluzye Model Forest, governmental agencies partnered with WWF to a significant extent in promoting certification. Government interest alone offset the lack of interest shown by local business, and therefore, allowed the project to exist. Without governmental commitment to certification, the model forest project would not be possible. In the Pskov Model Forest, WWF changed the attitude of government workers from sceptical to supportive through such initiatives as the small grant program. Still government support in Komi proved much greater and more consequential. The regional government of Komi expressed a sense of ownership over the model forest, suggesting that they saw it as the key to future economic development in the region. Yet, as we saw, the

lesser extent of government involvement did not diminish the success of the Pskov Model Forest.

In both cases from the Archangelsk region (Malashuika and Dammers), governmental involvement was minimal. In the Malashuika *leskboz*, members of administration saw FSC certification as a positive step, however, this was decisive for the success of the project. In Dvinskoy, the *leskboz* within which Dammers leases land heavily criticised company practices. The *leskboz* continuously penalised the operation and argued that it does not deserve FSC.

We see that governmental agencies must be involved to some extent in any certification trial. In Russia, the government acts as the owner and manager of forested land, but FSC certification is also possible without a strong commitment and initiative from the state. Our cases demonstrate that the main driving force behind success in FSC sustainable forestry is the non-state actor.

The importance of industry involvement in FSC introduction and dissemination

In both the Dammers case and the MalashuikaLes case, the original initiative for certification came from business. Furthermore, in both cases, NGO involvement was minimal. In Dvinskoy, Dammers signed a moratorium agreement with the forest club,¹⁶ and this was the extent of NGO-business relations. Dammers received an FSC certificate almost on its own. In Malashuika, a similar agreement was reached with very little additional interaction. In both cases, FSC certification was achieved with a minimum of NGO intervention and guidance. Still, both companies improved working conditions and safety standards, as well as basic environmental standards of operation. Without a media campaign though, public participation and social activity was weaker here than in WWF's model forests. Thus, these businesses have shown that they can go it alone and still meet FSC criteria, but the resultant sustainable forestry is weaker than when business teams up with an experienced NGO.

In the Pskov Model Forest, StoraEnso initiated and co-financed the certification effort. STF-Strugy was both involved in implementation of

the project, a stakeholder in its success, and a partner to WWF. This NGO-business partnership brought maximum results, and continues to serve as the greatest FSC success in Russian forests to date.

The Preluzye Model Forest also provides an important lesson—that FSC certification can be obtained even without the involvement of industry. In this region, a market incentive for certification does not exist due to the distance to the border with Europe. Governmental agencies, however, understood the benefits of certification and the need to develop a sustainable timber processing industry. While all of Preluzye was certified, only LuzaLes certified its chain of custody and reaped the benefits. This case shows that a strong NGO-government partnership can, in certain circumstances, supplant industry drive.

Conclusion

Our paper gives an overview of efforts by Greenpeace and WWF to introduce a European environmental ethic into Russia's forestry business. In the past ten years, these two organisations have become especially influential in the 'non-state driven market' (Cashore et al. 2004) of Russia's forest sector. The money for preservation and the culture of 'what needs to be preserved and how' is to a large extent filtered down from international headquarters into the newly formed Russian branches. We demonstrated how these organisations deal with the Russian government, industry, and the public. This paper attempts to illustrate the barriers NGOs face in importing Western environmentalism to different stakeholders in the forest and different sectors of Russian society. We illustrated the strategies and opportunities that allow them to link, network, and accomplish the objectives of their projects. Thereby, specific characteristics of Russian political, economic, and social culture was brought to light.

Many sociologists have described those aspects of globalisation processes that relate to environmental protection (Yearley 1994). Many reports have focused on the negative aspects of globalisation for local communities and natural resources. As in our case, globalisation processes can, in fact, be quite beneficial for the growth of environmental movements. There

is a niche in environmental sociology concerning these positive outcomes (Spaargaren, Mol & Buttel 2000). Our paper pertains to this niche by showing the beneficial consequences of international NGOs protecting Russia's forests. Other researchers, although few, have dealt with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the expansion of its legitimacy (Cashore et al. 2004; McNichol 2003). These studies have only covered FSC processes in Western countries. This paper represents the first to examine NGO-driven processes of FSC expansion into the former Soviet Union.

We show that through the processes of European enlargement, Russia is influenced by the operations of transboundary environmental organisations. Their efforts to green European establishments and citizens are now constantly filtering through the border. European institutions such as the European Parliament and the European Commission are developing environmental policies for whole regions, and closely partnering with WWF's Brussels office. Mainly through third sector efforts, the environmental consciousness and concern of European citizens and companies are not caged within the nation-state, nor within the political boundaries of Western Europe. Rather, they have become global. As we saw in our paper, the environmental sensitivity encouraged by NGOs in Europe influences Russian institutions and the ways in which Russian citizens interact with their natural landscape. This cross-border penetration, however, can only reach into Russia's vast interior to a limited extent.

This paper illustrates how the lack of pre-existing civil society infrastructure makes the transplantation of FSC difficult in Russian villages. Many of the social aspects of FSC certification, primarily community participation in forestry decision making, must be built from the ground up. This creates a major hindrance to environmental organisations, which are trying to import sustainable technologies from more environmentally and socially advanced countries. NGOs must often create new institutions from scratch. Russia's civil society is young and undeveloped, and so intersectoral dialogue is also new. This paper shows how these international NGOs use the forces of the market to jump-start such institutions and create a basis for social, environmental, and economic modernisation within Russia's forestry sector. It also looks at the attempt to have the values of sustainable forestry rooted in Russian society and accepted by

all relevant forestry players. While the Russian branches of these organisations work to better the supply side of the market, other branches in European countries work to better the demand side. The success of these international networks is extremely consequential for the preservation of the world's valuable forest supply into the future.

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Notes

- ¹ Interview with TITAN Holding's representative, July 6, 2004 and interview with State Duma Sub-Committee of Forestry representative, July 5, 2004.
- ² Interview with Academician Isaev, July 6, 2004 and interview with Nefediev, Ministry of Natural Resources representative, March 2004.
- ³ Interview with the Head of the State Duma Committee on Natural Resources, July 5, 2004.
- ⁴ Interview with State Duma Deputy, July 5, 2004.
- ⁵ Interview with Academician Isaev, July 6, 2004; interview with Communist Party Representative at State Duma, July 5, 2004.
- ⁶ Interview with State Duma Deputy, July 5, 2004.
- ⁷ International NGO with headquarters in Sweden.
- ⁸ Interview with STF-Strugy manager, Strugy Krasnie, 2002.
- ⁹ Interview with Burmistrov, WWF staff, Director of the Pskov Model Forest, Strugy Krasnie, 2002.
- ¹⁰ The amount of wood now produced in Russia by GFTN members remains a small percentage of total timber trade. WWF hopes to increase these numbers.

- ¹¹ Interview with director of STF-Strugy, 2002.
- ¹² 'Virgin Forests' in WWF Bulletin, No. 1 March 2001. p. 2.
- ¹³ This change was in name only. The same group of people run the project, however, they no longer belong to or receive funding from WWF.
- ¹⁴ Interview with coordinator of Economy Group, Preluzye Model Forest, 2002.
- ¹⁵ Note: FSC certification does not prohibit the logging of old-growth forests altogether. Rather, it demands a strategy of conservation and reasonable use.
- ¹⁶ The Forest Club consists of Greenpeace Russia, the Center for Biodiversity Conservation, and the Social Ecological Union.

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