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## **Green car concepts and the German Greens**

This paper traces the development of a 'green car' discourse in the German Greens in the late 1990s and the red-green coalition. The discourse is contextualised with regard to coalition and economic constraints, German car culture, and the political effects of policies deemed 'anti-car.' Key 'green car' statements are further presented as illustrations of the 'ecological modernisation' at the core of Green environmental policy, and the party's increasing focus on individual liberties. The paper argues that while Greens had previously attacked mass private automobility, with technical measures to alleviate the environmental impact of cars seen as only a stop-gap solution in the face of need for systemic change, the green car discourse prioritises the 'greening' of the car in recognition of its place in modern Germany, and in celebration of individual mobility.

As part of a broader work in progress on the politics of cars and the German left - primarily the Social Democrats, or SPD, and the (West) German Greens - from 1973 to today, this paper presents my initial explorations of a 'green car' discourse which has emerged in the Greens since the late 1990s. With an emphasis on a series of key - and controversial - transport position papers published by party members in the late 1990s and during the federal red-green coalition from 1998-2005, this paper discusses the development of this green car discourse against a background of German car culture, Germany's economic situation in the 1990s, the pressures of coalition participation, and questions of Green electability, including instances of political campaigns and voter backlash against the Greens when Green policies were portrayed and perceived as attacking cars and drivers' rights. Moreover, the green car concepts articulated by sections of the party are related to the Greens' adoption of 'ecological modernisation' as the base of their environmental policy, and their increasing political focus on the protection of individual liberties. The wider investigation into the politics of cars in Germany provides a way to comment on the transformation of the left, in its attitudes to capitalism, modernity, technology, progress, and the environment, as well as the issue of how to address the car, this most mundane, useful, beloved, and environmentally harmful

technology, while a focus on the years of red-green coalition highlights the constraints of power, and the Greens' old dilemma of radical ideals versus vote maximisation and parliamentary participation.

This paper argues that the green car discourse is qualitatively different to Green attitudes to cars as represented in their transport policies from 1980 to 1998, which typically aimed to reduce the amount of travel which took place, and to shift what was deemed necessary travel away from cars and onto alternative means of transport. Technical measures to alleviate the air and also noise pollution produced by cars, for instance fuel efficiency and emissions reduction technologies, were regarded as an important means of immediate improvement but as inadequate responses to systemic environmental destruction. While the key papers and statements contributing to the green car discourse often contain explicit reference to the need to preference rail over road, and recognition of the unsustainability of present growth rates in global automobile ownership and use, they simultaneously: choose to focus on improving cars - for instance through efficiency, emissions reduction, or most prominently through alternative propulsion - rather than discouraging the use of cars; portray mass private automobility as permanent, indispensable, and in many ways beneficial, in particular by recasting demand for travel in terms of a positively connoted individual mobility; urge the abandonment of goals which contradict this view of mass car use, often in connection with an analysis of the political drawbacks to any challenge to cars; and specifically regard the aim of reducing the amount of travel people undertake as futile. This takes place within a wider framework in which environmental protection is portrayed as requiring no personal sacrifice, and as mutually reinforcing economic growth.

John Dryzek defines ecological modernisation, which both Green and Social Democratic party programmes nominate as the principle guiding their environmental policies, as "a structuring of the capitalist political economy along more environmentally sound lines." In ecological modernisation, ecological problems are dealt with by adapting existing industrial structures to promote a cleaner, greener economy using environmentally friendly technology. More than a technical issue, it requires political intervention and industry's cooperative participation, motivated by profit. It is also a discourse of reassurance, writes Dryzek, assuring residents of relatively prosperous

developed societies, at least, that no tough choices need be made between economic growth and environmental protection, or between the present and the long-term future (Dryzek 1997, 137-152). Angelika Zahrnt outlines the place of cars in ecological modernisation: energy efficient and low emission cars are understood as bringing votes, environmental protection, automobility, and a flourishing automobile industry, with increasing exports and turnover. Cars are to be cleaned, redesigned and tamed, but not removed – ecological modernisers do not see anything inherently wrong with car ownership or extensive road networks, and cars and the automobile industry are recognised for their centrality to economic growth (Zahrnt 2001).

This contrasts with the Greens' earlier vision, outlined above, in which cars – even cleaner cars – played a much smaller role. This vision typically called for more space to be created for pedestrians and cyclists, in connection with public transport, and living arrangements to be geared to decrease movement. The priority was not technical solutions but a change in culture away from heavy reliance on private cars; for example several Greens criticised Greenpeace in the mid-1990s for its 3-litre car campaign - promoting a car which would run 100 km on 3 litres of petrol - for helping to stabilise a destructive transport system (Burmeister & Hickmann 1997). Moreover, Green transport policy through to 1998 heavily criticised numerous aspects of automobile society beyond air pollution, including the extensive land use, social alienation, and death and injury automobile society entailed. Hence Green programmes from 1980 to 1998 called for reducing “the domination of the automobile,” “the end of the car as a means of mass transit,” “the end of the automobile society,” and a *Verkehrswende*, a turning point or revolution in transport away from the mass use of cars (e.g., Die Grünen 1986, 39-44; Die Grünen 1990, 10-11; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1994, 9), according to the motto: “The best traffic is that which is never created in the first place” (Die Grünen 1997, 44). Technical solutions were an important part of Green transport policy, and their 1983 basic programme called for the eventual replacement of petrol with hydrogen or methanol (Die Grünen, 1983, 22), however such fixes were described as an inadequate response to environmental destruction, and placed within the holistic framework of reducing the need to travel and reliance on cars, and a willingness to challenge automobile society. Founded in 1980, the party championed individual autonomy as demanded by the new social

movements of the preceding decade, for instance alternative lifestyle choices and the breaking down of rigid moral codes, but where it came to environmental policy and transport in particular, Green statements tended to place the commonwealth above individual desires, and call for self-restraint and ecological responsibility in individual transport decisions.

In 1998, the Greens pursued the explicit goal of red-green coalition. The party congress in Magdeburg in March agreed on a programme for the October election; it included a demand, agreed between the realist and leftist party factions and passed with a solid majority, for petrol taxes to increase by 50 *Pfennig* in the first year, and thereafter in annual 30 *Pfennig* increments. “Following our concept,” the Greens wrote, “1 litre of petrol would cost around 5DM in 10 years” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998, 17). The programme also called for a speed limit of 100km/h on the *Autobahn*, 80 on ordinary roads (*Landstraßen*), and 30 in built-up areas (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998, 19), demands represented in Green election programmes and parliamentary work since the early 1980s (Corneisen 1986, 138-1139), but which have been absent from some more recent papers, for example the 2002 revision of the Greens’ basic programme (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002, 29; Schmidt, et al. 2005, 12). Soon after the Magdeburg congress, one Green parliamentarian suggested aircraft fuel be taxed like petrol, and that it was enough for Germans to fly abroad on holiday once every five years (Frankland, 1999, 114). These ideas received an enormous amount of attention.

Similar Green resolutions on petrol taxes had previously attracted little notice, however with a red-green coalition a realistic prospect for the first time, the 5DM figure dominated media coverage of the party for weeks. The concept of 5DM per litre of petrol was not an end in itself, but a symbol for the Greens’ main policy thrust, the so-called ‘eco-tax.’ Higher energy prices, in this case petrol prices, would represent realistic pricing and encourage fuel efficiency, for example the development of the 3 litre car, and at the same time eco-tax revenue was to flow into social insurance and hence aid employment by helping to shift the tax burden away from non-wage labour costs and onto environmental ‘bads.’ However the nuances of ecological taxation did not feature in media soundbites, which focused on the 5DM figure in isolation. The figure was also the target of political attack – the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and

Christian Social Union (CSU) in particular campaigned heavily on prices for the average driver, as if a red-green government would make petrol cost 5DM/litre overnight, while the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) portrayed Green policy as an attack on mobility, and the SPD distanced itself from the Greens. SPD Chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder declared before the election that under his leadership, no eco-tax would increase petrol prices annually by more than 6 *Pfennig*/litre, a promise later upheld in the red-green coalition agreement (Arzheimer & Klein 1999, 24; Frankland 2000, 87). At a time of over 10% unemployment, an impression was created of the Greens as a party out of touch with the fears and desires of the German electorate, East and West, many of whom were unemployed or insecure in their jobs - and reliant on their cars (Arzheimer & Klein 1999, 28; Gottschlich 1998a, 103). According to founding Green Roland Vogt, Easterners in particular reacted to reports on Green petrol prices with fear that they had just got their first car and now the Greens wanted to take it away (Jensen 1998, 20); Wolfgang Rüdig, one of the most important scholars of Green politics, writes that “the Greens were portrayed [...] as ‘spoilsports’ who wanted to take away what most ordinary Germans saw as the embodiment of social progress: running a car and holidays in the sun” (Rüdig 2002, 82).

Support for the Greens plummeted in the wake of the Magdeburg congress. The Greens lost a third to a half of their votes, in some cases their parliamentary presence, in four states (Frankland 2000, 87-88), and their performance in opinion polls was reduced by about half, with only around 5% of respondents (down from around 10%) reporting that they planned to vote Green. Kai Arzheimer and Markus Klein studied daily opinion poll data from the time a concrete Green demand for petrol prices of nearly 5DM/litre was reported in January 1997, to 25 September 1998; Arzheimer and Klein concluded there was a “high probability” of a direct causal relationship between the 5DM claim and the Greens’ collapse in support (Arzheimer & Klein 1999, 20). Polls also indicated that not even a majority of people who identified as Green voters supported an *Autobahn* speed limit of 100km/h (Frankland 2000, 89). The Greens rushed to backtrack from the statements in their March election programme.

The party executive created a short version of the programme in June 1998. Transport policy was included as a subsection under the heading, “Ecology creates jobs,”

and specific goals such as 5DM/litre and 100km/h were absent. These were replaced by a general articulation of the Greens' desire for "a transport system that is both environmentally benign and economically efficient"; a promise to lift motor vehicle taxes in favour of mineral oil taxes was maintained (Bündnis 90/Greens 1998, 4-6). In subsequent discussions of their programme, leading Greens put the struggle against unemployment first, stressing the eco-tax's function as social, not environmental, policy. For instance Bundestag representative (MdB) and soon to be foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, explained: "For us, the central question is: with what suggestions, which what measures can we achieve a turnaround in the job market? That is [...] the central question in the eco-tax. [...] We don't want an eco-tax that demands of people that they tighten their belts" (Nesenhöner et al. 1998, 98-99). To address charges that the Greens would make driving the privilege of the wealthy, Green spokespersons pointed out that the rise in petrol taxes would be partially offset, first by lower car taxes and eventually by the fuel efficient cars higher petrol prices would encourage; there would also be provisions for special needs groups including commuters with no access to public transport (Frankland 1999, 111). Nor, Green politicians stressed, did the Greens want to ruin anyone's holiday: the suggestion of limiting flights to once every five years was dismissed as an unreasonable demand (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion 1998, 3). Party leaders described the 5DM figure as the wrong symbol for the right thing, or as a mistake from which they had learnt (Frankland 1999, 111). For instance Marieluise Beck said fixing petrol's price in ten years had been wrong, as it indicated a planned economy, created the impression the Greens did not care about social justice, and worst of all, it told people the Greens were not seeking a majority and planned to impose ecological policies against the people's will (Fahrun 1998, 22). Critics in the Greens, on the other hand, objected to party leaders' marginalisation of a congress resolution, and their representation of ecological politics as revenue-neutral, and as all too easy (Nesenhöner et al. 1998, 103).

In the October elections, the SPD received 40.9% of the vote and the Greens 6.7%, and the parties entered coalition negotiations. During negotiations, Schröder, who had very close links to the car industry and proudly described himself as a car-man, reassured voters he was taking a strong line with the Greens, and warned against what he

called “automobile phobia,” as illustrated by Green proposals for petrol prices and speed limits (Lees 2000, 103). According to Charles Lees, in his coalition-theory study of the red-green coalition, Schröder rejected the speed limit partly “out of fear of antagonizing ordinary motorists who regarded the freedom to drive as fast as their vehicle would permit as an inalienable right” (Lees 2000, 118). Observers of German car culture frequently relate a German notion of the freedom to drive fast to the development of West German car culture in tandem with - and in fact mutually reinforcing - postwar processes of democratisation and Westernisation; in particular, concepts of speed in Germany are often interpreted in light of the close association between liberty and consumption which evolved from the postwar economic miracle (Boulter 1980; Höfig 1999). The focus on speed as a key measure of performance was also the result of motor industry lobbying, which framed the proposed 100km/h speed limit as an economic disaster that would cost Germany jobs, sending them to Italy, France and South Korea. Lees notes that the lobby did not explain why a speed limit in Germany would send German jobs to countries which had speed limits, but sees this claim as proof of the power of the *Standort* argument concerning German competitiveness in the global business arena – a party was vulnerable if its policy could be seen as hindering German competitiveness. The CDU also ran an anti-speed limit advertisement condemning the Greens’ supposed attack on freedom and mobility, and the FDP labeled Greens the party of “sacrifice and restriction” (Lees 2000, 118).

The red-green government introduced an eco-tax on energy, and the tax on petrol, in particular, was attacked by a number of groups. For instance in autumn 2000, when petrol prices rose due to a variety of factors, German car clubs, some industries, opposition parties, and parts of the media, notably the tabloid *Bild* newspaper, blamed the higher prices on the eco-tax and joined together in what was labeled the “petrol-rage campaign” (Jänicke, Mez & Piening 2001, 5-6). In populist actions, the CDU called for the tax’s removal, and the FDP offered completely tax-free petrol at a Berlin petrol station for one hour, by paying the difference in drivers’ bills (Kuhlbrodt 2000, 5). *Bild* revived the petrol-rage campaign in 2005, making Green environment minister Jürgen Trittin the primary target. In a *Bild* interview, Trittin had said that drivers should drive more fuel-efficient cars, switch to cheaper cars which ran on natural gas or biodiesel,

drive so as to conserve fuel, and “now and then, leave the car at home and use the bus and train.” *Bild* shortened this statement, focusing only on the words “now and then leave the car at home” as part of an attempt to demonise Trittin. Trittin took legal action against the newspaper for quoting him out of context, though the shortened quote would not have been out of place in Green transport policy in the 1980s and 1990s (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 2005). The Greens rarely described higher petrol prices as better for the environment, and instead criticised oil multinationals and inadequate competition in the industry for causing the high prices (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion 2005b; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundestagsfraktion 2005c; Hurrelmann 2001, 5; Raschke 2001, 234).

A number of ‘green car papers’ were published by prominent Greens between 1997 and 2005. Under the rubric of realistic, doable transport policy, these papers urged Greens to accept the current role of the car and commit themselves first to a policy of greening - not limiting - automobiles. The papers also approached transport policy strategically, arguing that attacks on cars meant lost votes. According to these papers, the Greens’ 1990 election disaster, where they had campaigned on climate change, then the Magdeburg experience had shown that the voting public could not be asked to make sacrifices. On the other hand, support for greener cars, for example fuel efficient cars or cars using alternative propulsion methods, could at once serve the Greens’ political profile, the environment, and the German auto industry.

In 1997, Green members Ulrich Burmeister and Gerd Hickmann argued that Green transport concepts were understood by the public as unreasonable and as an attack on their standard of living. The public’s emotional negative reaction to Green transport policy was, moreover, easily abused by the Greens’ political opponents, thus “Solutions which are imposed on people against their will,” were political suicide. Furthermore: “Austere ideologies of denial” did not fit “the mood of the people”; goals which called for restraint did not enthuse anyone; relying on a bad conscience inspired opposition; and driving should be allowed to be fun (Burmeister & Hickmann 1997, 1-15). According to Burmeister and Hickmann, the Greens should see increasing traffic as a reflection of the individualisation of society and the pluralisation of lifestyles. Individual need for mobility contradicted the idea of ecologically necessary limitations, which Green

transport policy had traditionally supported. But as, in their estimation, the Greens had in recent years become more of a libertarian party - and several political scientists have argued in similar terms (Blühdorn 2004; Talshir 2003) - Green transport policy should no longer be aimed at controlling people. Because the car was going to remain the dominant means of transport for the foreseeable future, the authors argued that the Greens' first priority should be the improvement of the existing system, and an "enlightened attitude to technical solutions" would also be good for the car industry, as whoever developed the three litre car first would be ahead on the world market. In sum, the Greens should reverse their current priorities. Instead of focusing first on avoiding traffic, then on shifting traffic away from cars, then on lessening cars' environmental effects, the Greens should begin with improving the car (Burmeister & Hickmann 1997, 1-15).<sup>1</sup>

Three years later, Green transport policy was overhauled again in a paper by popular realist and lover of fast cars, Rezzo Schlauch, together with fellow MdBs and environmental and transport experts Michael Hustedt and Albert Schmidt, called "Driving with Sun and Water" (Schlauch, Hustedt, & Schmidt 2000), much like a then BMW slogan ("BMW World - Expo 2000" 2000). The paper represented an attempt to break with the image of the Greens a party of "technology and mobility spoilsports" (Kriener 2000, 1). Launching the paper, Schlauch said it was time to deal "more honestly" with the "number 1 means of transport." A car was not just a status symbol, he said, but also meant "fascination," and "emancipation" for many people; the paper argued that cars also meant security, and for women they represented "the only possibility to manage family and career." Yet the Greens' attitude towards cars had shown Schlauch that "too often, the ecology question is communicated by the Greens as a question of the loss of quality of life." Therefore the Greens should overcome their "emotional anti-reflex," and develop a "zero-emission car" (Mestmacher 2000, 54; Raschke 2001, 235-236). The paper heavily emphasised the promise of vehicles run on renewably produced hydrogen as a way to achieve the necessary reconciliation between 'fascination' and 'responsibility' in transport.

Reactions to this paper varied. For example while Trittin claimed the ideas were "nothing new," as the Greens had "never demonised" the car, and MdB Winfried Hermann said it had been years since the Greens had made any "dumb anti-car policies"

(Raschke 2001, 235-236),<sup>2</sup> Green environmental expert Reinhard Loske criticised Schlauch's "flattery of the *Zeitgeist*," remarking: "A Green [...] who sings paeans to the car, [...] is nothing but a bad joke" ("Rezzo schlaucht die Grünen" 2000, 1).<sup>3</sup> Fischer, in turn, dismissed Loske as a "guardian of the faith," like "Cardinal Ratzinger" (Raschke 2001, 236). Other critics questioned the way the authors emphasised the hydrogen car without considering the difficulties associated with producing a marketable version, or other problems with automotive society apart from emissions, for instance sustainability: viewing demand for individual automobility as legitimate meant accepting rapid growth in global car numbers. Environmental transport expert Burkhard Reinartz argued the paper merely exchanged one one-sided view for another – from the rejection of car use to the conviction that fuel cells were the way forward (Reinartz 2000, 3), while Green realist strategist Achim Hurrelmann objected to the insistence, particularly from members of the realist faction, that there was no contradiction between ecology and economy, to the seeming interchangeability of the terms "sustainable environmental policy" and "ecological modernisation of the economy" in Green discourses, and to the impression that climate protection would not affect anyone's quality of life in a negative way. Hurrelmann stressed the need to recognise that many environmental problems could not be solved through technical innovation, for instance through the hydrogen car, but instead required fundamental structural change (Hurrelmann 2001, 3-4).

"Driving with Sun and Water" placed Green transport policy firmly within the bounds of *Realpolitik*, arguing that because "the vast majority of the population," including Green voters, "objects to any reduction of car transport," the Greens should not advocate it. Raschke lends support to this statement, pointing out that it is difficult to implement traditional Green positions on transport, as only around 20% of Germans agree with demands for an *Autobahn* speed limit of less than 130 km/h, or with demands which would make driving significantly more expensive; Raschke also emphasises the fact that on no other environmental topic do surveys show a greater discrepancy in the German population between environmental awareness and actual behaviour (Raschke 2001, 237). Critics, on the other hand, asked how the Greens would differentiate themselves from their political competition, when the paper could just as easily have come from the liberal FDP (Palmer 2004a).

More recent papers have continued this development, away from a general critique of cars or unlimited individual automobility, and towards acceptance – even celebration – of the car and mobility, and a focus on the need to lessen the environmental impact of cars through increased fuel efficiency, hybrid technologies, hydrogen cells, or biodiesel, as well as through social innovations, namely car-sharing and car-pooling. In April 2004, Fritz Kuhn, Schmidt, and Hustedt declared the *Verkehrswende* dead - doomed to fail because people associated switching to public transport with restrictions. Kuhn, Schmidt and Hustedt suggested emphasising the positively connoted word ‘travel’ (*reisen*), instead of ‘traffic’ or ‘transport’ (*Verkehr*), and explained: “Our own members and voters like to travel extensively: The holiday in the USA, visiting friends in Cairo, participating in a conference in London, a few free days in a spa on the Baltic sea, living with your children in the country – all of this creates traffic.” Traffic avoidance as programme was but a ‘lie the Greens had been living,’ (*Lebenslüge*) - Greens should concentrate on technical innovation instead (Schmidt, Kuhn & Hustedt 2004). In reaction, Boris Palmer, transport spokesperson for the Greens in the Baden-Württemberg state parliament, called on Greens to retain the imperative of “ecological responsibility” as the guide to individual mobility decisions (Palmer 2004b), and environmental transport expert and author on the subject of a transport revolution, Markus Hesse, deplored the authors’ dismissal of Green demands (*Anspruch*) simply because the gap between demands and reality had increased (Hesse 2001; Hesse 2004).

Finally, as part of the Greens’ “Away from Oil” strategy for dealing with the post-cheap oil era, a group of Bundestag members produced the 2005 “Green Car Paper.” The paper’s authors argued that, “Without a fundamental change of propulsion, fuel, and production techniques, the creation and use of automobiles will soon reach its natural limits. In short: The car of the future will run on solar power (in the broadest sense) or not at all” (Schmidt et al. 2005, 5). The paper described no radical scenarios of reorganised living and traveling, but rather this car of the future: Lighter and more efficient, it will use less energy, its propulsion method will be climate neutral, and it will have negligible or zero emissions. The authors praised numerous examples of corporate environmental improvements, for example Mercedes’ use of Brazilian coconut fiber in certain car seats (Schmidt et al. 2005, 9), and they also saw their paper as a contribution

to the future of Germany as a car manufacturer, and to securing the 770 000 jobs in the German industry (Schmidt et al. 2005, 5).<sup>4</sup>

The Greens had been moving towards these positions over 25 years. They had begun to discuss not abandoning capitalism but reforming it in the 1980s, most prominently in their 1986 economic programme (Die Grünen 1986), and by the mid-1990s an ecological taxation system had become the centrepiece of the Greens' concept for reforming industrial society (Mayer & Ely 1998, 267). Initial Green eco-tax proposals envisaged the primary recipient of revenue thus generated to be environmental projects such as public transport (e.g. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1994, 14; Die Grünen 1990, 11), but the Greens moderated these proposals according to the major political discussions of the 1990s, and came to suggest eco-taxes be used to reduce secondary labour costs such as the pension contributions which served as a disincentive to hiring (Rüdiger 2002, 99). In the mid-1990s, some Greens also began to argue in terms of the power of the market to produce a cleaner car (Edwards 1994, 12). Although press coverage and public opinion seemed to interpret the 5DM agreement as proof the Greens had temporarily abandoned realism, Klein and Arzheimer insist it was more a reflection of the Greens fitting into mainstream German political economic discourses than old Green fundamentalism (Arzheimer & Klein 1999, 27).

In conclusion, in response to the realisation that traditional Green transport policy was out of touch with most voters' attitudes to cars, leading party members argued that the Greens should recognise cars as Germany's "number 1 mode of transport." New Green positions on 'greening' cars rather than emphasising alternatives were an expression of ecological modernisation's aim of improving the environment by reforming existing structures. The Magdeburg debacle further taught the Greens not to present environmental policy as a question of sacrifice, especially not where it involved cars, and the party's subsequent embrace of the value of the individual mobility cars enable reflected a broader development away from a moral emphasis on self-restraint for the common good, and towards a philosophy emphasising individual liberty.

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<sup>1</sup> For further attempts to soften the Greens' image as "car haters" in the late 1990s and 2000, see 'Grünes Herz für Autos' (2000), *Der Spiegel* 41: 18; and Gerd Rosenkranz (1999), 'Charme als Waffe', *Der Spiegel* 41: 50-54. For further evidence of the Green recasting of travel and transport in terms of a positive individual mobility, see the Green keywords "sustainable mobility," and "ecologically mobile," for

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example as used in Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2002), 'The Future is Green', Party programme and principles, Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz resolution Berlin, March 15-17: 29; and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, 'Koalitionsvertrag 2002-2006: Erneuerung – Gerechtigkeit – Nachhaltigkeit. Für ein wirtschaftlich starkes, soziales und ökologisches Deutschland. Für eine lebendige Demokratie', [http://www.boell.de/downloads/gedaechtnis/2002\\_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf](http://www.boell.de/downloads/gedaechtnis/2002_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf), [downloaded 15 June 2006]. For discussion of the political attraction of the reassuring idea of "sustainable mobility centred around clean-fuelled automobiles," see Paul Mees (2000), *A Very Public Solution: Transport in the Dispersed City*, Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 60.

<sup>2</sup> In 1994, Hermann himself had argued that the car industry was "not an industry of the future," even if it produced cars that needed less petrol, and that car production should be converted to a range of "mobility services," including taxis, buses, trains, trams and bikes." Hermann, quoted in Rob Edwards (1994), 'Hard-boiled Greens', *New Statesman & Society* (2 September): 12.

<sup>3</sup> See also Reinhard Loske, (1999), 'Thesen zur Erneuerung bündnisgrüner Umweltpolitik', excerpted in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 13.

<sup>4</sup> The Green Car Paper was generally praised by both the traditional German auto club ADAC and the environmentally-oriented Verkehrsclub Deutschland (VCD). Michael Gehrman (VCD) (2005), 'Packt es an!', *schrägstrich 2* (May): 26; and Erhard Oehm (ADAC) (2005), 'Das Auto sinnvoll Neubewerten', *schrägstrich 2* (May): 28.

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